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I.  Abstract 
 
 
In this project I aim to challenge the conception of  neo-liberalism as a monolithic ideology 
and theory of  state practice. To achieve this, I use Norman Fairclough’s ‘order of  
discourse’ model of  critical discourse analysis to examine seven speeches delivered by New 
Zealand Prime Ministers of  1987 to 2011. Using these speeches I chart a number of  
breaks, shifts, contradictions, and instabilities between both Prime Ministers and 
Governments, which are often specific to New Zealand. The analyses of  the seven 
speeches highlight the contradictions and tensions inherent in on-going processes of  neo-
liberalisation in New Zealand. Among other instabilities and contradictions, I examine 
David Lange’s conflicting articulations of  economic management in market-led governing. 
I note the role of  technocracy under Geoffrey Palmer, and the inconsistencies in his push 
to institutionalise the Treaty of  Waitangi while decentralising the role of  the state in 
governing. I outline the specificities of  New Zealand as a colonial settler society through 
the signifier “battler” deployed by Mike Moore. I also sketch the functions of  Jim Bolger’s 
communitarianism, and the way it flanks the market logics deployed by Minister of  Finance 
Ruth Richardson, between 1990 and 1993. The effect and significance of  Jenny Shipley’s 
‘Code of  Social and Family Responsibility’ is examined, noting the way it crystallises the 
role of  social capital in practices of  governing. The impact of  Helen Clark’s Third Way and 
‘inclusive’ neo-liberalism are then charted. Clark’s use of  diverse ideological forms suggests 
a mobile and mediating moment in neo-liberalism, which attempts to overcome some of  
the problems generated by earlier speakers. I finally cover the way that John Key’s anti-
ideological position results in what is labelled the ‘market ideology’, crystallising market 
logic as a rubric for governing through terms like the “mum and dad investor”, and the 
“kiwi”. I then offer some concluding comments and note the project’s limitations, before 
offering some tentative prospects of  neo-liberalism’s fortune in a post-2008 crisis world.  
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1.  The Neo-liberal Term and Turn: Theoretical and Methodological 
 Considerations 
 
 
In this chapter I introduce some ways of  understanding neo-liberalism before advancing a 
research design and a summary of  the following chapters. I begin by noting some key 
moments in the development of  neo-liberalism as a model for structural adjustment. I then 
outline some foundational and ideological properties of  neo-liberalism. A section is then 
devoted to delineating the broad and often totalizing nature of  neo-liberalism as an 
ideological model, attending to neo-liberalism’s often messy, contradictory and spontaneous 
nature. I argue for a nuanced and subtle examination of  ideological structures within neo-
liberalism.  
 
I will then advance critical discourse analysis as a framework for investigating neo-
liberalism in New Zealand. This draws predominantly on the ‘order of  discourse’ approach 
by Norman Fairclough (1998), but also takes technical cues from the work of  Ruth Wodak 
(2001). The research material is made up of  speeches delivered by the last seven Prime 
Ministers of  New Zealand, beginning with David Lange and ending with John Key. The 
research design addresses three levels of  discourse analysis. It begins by noting the broad 
conditions of  possibility for discourse at the time the speech was delivered. This is 
followed by an investigation of  discursive phrases or key words at the meso level, and ends 
by describing the grammatical strategies which represent markets and people in particular 
ways.  
 
Due to the divergent and contradictory nature of  neo-liberalism, I also draw support from 
Foucault on governmentality (1991) and power (2008); Gramsci (1992) on hegemony and 
common sense; Althusser (1971) on the ideological state apparatus, as well as Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) and Habermas (1981) on discourse. Finally, I address some limitations of  
the research design before offering a summary of  the chapters ahead. 
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1.1  What is Neo-liberalism? 
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of  political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. (Harvey, 2005, p. 2) 
 
I use neo-liberalisation rather than neo-liberalism to describe on-going processes of  social 
change associated with free markets. This highlights the emergent and unstable nature of  
neo-liberalism as an ideological assemblage, rather than a stable essentialist ideology. 
(Phelan, 2012) 
 
Since the 1970s in most states there has been a dramatic turn away from the post-war 
Keynesian model of  economic management. This was characterised by price controls, state 
supported social welfare and full employment. Due to steady inflation, increasing 
unemployment and economic stagnation, Keynesian policies have been increasingly 
replaced by a market oriented approach organised around privatisation, market de-
regulation, and the removal of  state guaranteed social security (Gray, 1998; Harvey, 2005). 
This shift was particularly apparent within the United Kingdom, United States and other 
western states, but in one way or another affected the entire capitalist world. In New 
Zealand, the voluntary embrace of  neo-liberalisation was swift and deep, and would be 
adopted as a dominant social order after a number of  events and crises aligned. 
 
These new organisational forms were based on the monetarist and anti-inflationary 
doctrines of  economists like Milton Friedman (1962), backed by critiques of  state by 
Freidrich Hayek (1960). These critiques denoted a “preference for market over state, 
individual over collective interests, and economic freedom over political freedom” 
(Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960 in; Phelan, 2007, p. 10). Initially treated as a throwback to 
laissez-faire economics, these ideas were taken up with speed and vigour, partly due to their 
flexible nature.   
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Flexibility is perhaps the most identifiable tenet of  neo-liberalisation. A watch-word not 
only for markets, as Harvey (2005) notes, but also for the construction of  family 
arrangements, identities, and state structures. While flexibility is romantically construed as 
enhancing choice and freedom, it is also tied to flexible accumulation and labour conditions 
resulting in “lower wages, increasing job insecurity, and in many instances loss of  benefits 
and of  job protections” (Harvey, 2005, p. 76).  
 
The structural adjustment of  New Zealand is sometimes recognised as the “least impure” 
(Jessop, 2002, p. 457) example of  neo-liberalisation in state practice. After the election of  
1984 and well into the 1990s, it seemed that a market led approach could provide answers 
for nearly every aspect of  governing. Few institutions were spared de-regulation, far 
exceeding most other voluntary pursuits of  the free-market.  
 
After a snap election in 1984 the New Zealand dollar was devalued by 20 per cent, other 
price control and stabilisation mechanisms were removed soon after. Further de-regulation 
was undertaken by the fourth National Government after the 1990 election; the 
Employment Contracts Act of  1991 wrote unions out of  the law, allowing aggressive wage 
negotiations by employers. By the late 1990s a free-market society was partly realised, 
complete with an ‘underclass’ of  the economically marginalised who found themselves 
between the government’s abandonment of  full employment and simultaneous roll-back of  
the welfare state (Kelsey, 1995).  
 
Women were particularly affected, with 40 per cent of  female Service Workers Union 
members experiencing a drop in income between 1991 and 1993 and still more women 
losing key sources of  financial support during benefit cuts in the same period. Neo-
liberalisation can thus be argued to generate a power imbalance where those in control of  
the state apparatus get more for less responsibility, while the marginalised and those 
concentrated in the working class bear much responsibility for comparatively little gain 
(Harvey, 2005).  
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Foundations of  Neo-liberalisation 
 
The founding figures of  neoliberal thought took political ideals of  individual liberty 
and freedom as sacrosanct—as the central values of  civilization. And in so doing 
they chose wisely and well, for these are indeed compelling and greatly appealing 
concepts (Harvey, 2007, p. 76). 
 
Alexander (1995, p. 73) notes that ideals like progress and freedom of  expression are 
reflected with passion and intensity in the civil rights movement of  the United States and 
in the associated reactions against collectivism; “It is about Tom Sawyer, and Huck Finn, 
about the yeoman farmer, and Horatio Alger”. These ideals would emerge in the protests 
of  1968 as a strong resistance to intrusive state practices and would eventually be folded 
into the resulting logics for governing throughout the 1980s. As Harvey (2005) notes, ‘big 
government’ and ‘mass society’ would be increasingly recognised as undermining freedom 
and opportunity, framing core public services as monolithic and inhuman.  
 
It is possible to see why neo-liberalisation as an ideological assemblage, representing 
flexible sets of  interdependent ideas and concepts, came to be recognised as increasingly 
coherent, by explaining a changing world in simple and effective terms. In New Zealand 
during the 1980s and early 1990s the ideas of  freedom and progress relied heavily on the 
discredit of  the former bureaucratised state, which had served the needs of  a post-war 
population through stability and employment, but appeared increasingly heavy handed and 
invasive (du Gay, 1996). 
 
Despite the apparent coherence of  neo-liberalisation, the problematique of  a distinct neo-
liberal ideology can be noted in a tension between ideology and outcome. In an effort to 
curb the excesses of  state spending and enhance productivity and freedom of  opportunity, 
government structures around the world have often only succeeded in moving towards a 
market state rather than a minimal state, a state which turns to “re-shaping social 
institutions on the model of  the market - a task that cannot be carried out by a small state” 
(Gray, 2010). This contradiction leads to a number of  questions around how neo-
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liberalisation unfolds, how its ends are pursued despite inconsistencies in its ideological 
premises.   
 
While some authors (see Clarke, 2008; Larner, 1998, 2005, 2009; Nadesan, 2011; Nairn & 
Higgins, 2007; Peck, 2004) investigate neo-liberalism’s specificities and contradictions at 
specific times, they tend to avoid broader trends and contradictions in its history. In New 
Zealand this leaves a dearth of  literature on both the historical context of  neo-liberalisation 
and its unstable and emergent nature. In New Zealand neo-liberalisation concerns ethnicity 
and colonisation through the Treaty of  Waitangi; it contains entrepreneurialism and social 
capital through the work of  Jenny Shipley, communitarianism through Jim Bolger and 
shibboleths like the “mum and dad investor” by John Key, to name but a few possibilities.  
 
 
What is, or isn’t, neo-liberal? 
 
Neo-liberalism has become something of  an academic catch phrase over the last 40 years. 
In seeking to explain new forms of  social organisation the term has acquired a “negative 
normative valence”, it has become a social theory “with which no-one wants to be 
associated” (Boas & Gans-Moore, 2009, p. 138). The examination of  neo-liberalisation in 
critical studies utilizes its central tenets in ubiquitous ways, conflating its logics with evil. It 
has been constructed as “backward, greedy, anarchic and impoverishing” (Alexander, 1995, 
p. 78). While not without justification, this position risks obfuscating some of  the nuanced 
and subtle characteristics of  neo-liberalisation.  
 
In this project I seek to challenge monolithic conceptions of  neo-liberalisation. I propose a 
more subtle treatment of  its logics, positioning its effects at specific moments in New 
Zealand’s history to show how it is deployed by key actors in unstable and often 
contradictory ways. However, not all features that flow from market led projects can be 
construed as neo-liberal in themselves. There is little in the present which neo-liberalisation 
cannot be held responsible for: in New Zealand one could speak of  unemployment, crime, 
recession, policy reform, privatisation, targeting, economic policy, profits and sustainability 
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(Clarke, 2008). This is not exhaustive and leads to a questioning of  what is, might be or 
isn’t neo-liberal. Such an extensive reach over social life has led Bondi and Lauri (2005, p. 
399) to assert that “there is no uncontaminated form of, or space for, political resistance” 
that exists “wholly outside neo-liberalism”.  
 
The ideological assemblages deployed by actors within neo-liberalisation often suggest 
evidence of  social ills, such as poverty and exclusion (Kelsey, 1995). However, labelling 
phenomena as pejoratively ‘neo-liberal’ conceals two important insights: the “most obvious 
one is that this site, practice, or process is the effect or consequence of  neoliberalism: it 
would not exist without neo-liberalism. The second…identifies the neoliberal articulation 
of  a pre-existing site, process, or practice” (Clarke, 2008, p. 139). Thus, a number of  social 
forms which appear within neo-liberalisation can be said to exist before or because of  it. 
The forms are not a crystallisation of  neo-liberalisation itself. This project thus seeks to 
partly fulfil a need to understand neo-liberalisation in multiple ways rather than in simple 
axiomatic terms, while retaining a degree of  critical evaluation of  those who work within it. 
 
A number of  approaches to neo-liberalisation have begun to question the differences 
within its structure, a body of  literature which this project adds to. Differences in time 
(Larner, 2000) emphasise alternations in phases of  political projects. Differences in place 
(Dezaley & Garth, 2005) highlight “on-going local variation and mutation” (Craig & 
Cotterell, 2007, p. 498). Some theorists have sought to understand neo-liberalisation as a 
series of  regulatory trends, reflecting specific modes of  de- or re-regulation as destructive 
and creative, or as creative destruction; the construction of  new forms through the 
destruction of  old ones (Harvey, 2007; Peck & Tickell, 2002).  
 
The body of  literature to which this project contributes revolves around the critical analysis 
of  discursive and linguistic structures within neo-liberalisation. I set this project apart from 
others in the field of  discursive study through its focus on Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
political transition since the 1980s, and an engagement with multiple levels of  discursive 
action. I consider macro, meso and micro levels of  discourse (these are unpacked later), 
and thus the way an ‘order’ of  discourse (Fairclough, 1995) occurs at different moments in 
the neo-liberalisation of  New Zealand. I seek to examine the types of  conjunctures and 
breaks which occur within this and to understand how they might relate to one another. 
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1.2  Methodology  
 
This section outlines the underlying methodological assumptions of  the project.  I will 
explain and justify the selection of  critical discourse analysis as the methodology. The 
methodological backdrop also draws general guiding support from Foucault on power and 
governmentality (Foucault, 1991, 2008), Gramsci (1992) on hegemony and common sense, 
and Althusser (1971) on the ideological state apparatus. I also deploy work from Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) and Habermas (1981) on discourse. Finally, a research design is offered and 
a number of  limitations explained. 
 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has previously been operationalised in relation to racism, 
xenophobia, sexism, violence, crime, and other social problems. While some studies have 
focused on the underlying assumptions, messages, and representations present in political 
speeches in relation to neo-liberalisation (van Dijk, 2000), none to date have focused on 
charting the contradictory and unstable discursive patterns of  neo-liberalisation in New 
Zealand.  
 
There are a number of  existing approaches to CDA all of  which take existing social 
problems as a point of  departure. Those deploying CDA attempt to go beyond: 
 
description or superficial application, critical science in each domain asks further 
questions, such as those of  responsibility, interests, and ideology. Instead of  
focusing purely on academic or theoretical problems, it starts from prevailing social 
problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of  those who suffer most, and 
critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible. (van Dijk, 1986, p. 4) 
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After nearly 30 years of  market led reform in New Zealand, a number of  prevailing social 
problems are clear. Central to many aspects of  neo-liberalisation has been the creation of  a 
competitive and stratified society with structural unemployment and high rates of  
inequality. Among other adjustments, this was realised through increasingly militant wage 
bargaining by employers, made possible by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. A loss of  
collective bargaining power meant that wages for much of  the working class fell or failed to 
rise with increasing living costs. Women, who were concentrated in secondary labour jobs, 
were disproportionately affected by labour market reform when male-dominated unions 
“militated” against a push to re-introduce the Employment Equity Bill which would have 
legislated for a degree of  pay equality (Kelsey, 1995, p. 286; O'Brien & Wilkes, 1993). A key 
enquiry for this project is the ways these changes and many others were achieved 
democratically and consensually, through a degree of  discursive and ideological 
manipulation. 
 
Three main models of  CDA have been developed: a socio-cognitive approach, a discourse-
historical, and order of  discourse approach. Each builds on the work of  the Frankfurt 
school, adopting a cultural-Marxist stance grounded in an understanding of  power, 
dominance, ideology and discourse as a social practice transmitted and constituted in part 
by language (Jürgen Habermas, 1981).   
 
The socio-cognitive model of  CDA (van Dijk, 1998, 2001) emphasises the cognitive aspect 
of  discourse. Van Dijk (1998) suggests that those who are able to dictate the various 
dimensions of  discourse are able to dictate the conditions for its reproduction and thus the 
conditions for discursive action. Van Dijk’s assumptions of  power, which are reduced to 
“mind management”, diverges significantly from other approaches to CDA, which see it as 
a productive social force in the vein of  Foucault. This is significant because a Focuauldian 
view of  power recognises that power can be disseminated in discourse, simultaneously 
constraining and empowering social action.   
 
The discourse-historical approach to CDA (Wodak, 2009, 2012) revolves around immanent 
critique (exposition of  internal contradictions), socio-diagnostic critique (exposing coercive 
discourses through personal experience), and prognostic critique (supporting social 
change), each oriented around prejudicial discourses. The discourse-historical model lends 
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significant weight to historical context but gives comparatively little attention to hegemony 
or conditions of  social change. However, Wodak’s (2001) work provides a useful technical 
cue in a framework for representing social action. It suggests a micro analysis of  the way 
social action is constructed through grammatical choices. This is important because 
grammatical choices can represent particular views of  reality, informed by ideology and 
historical context. I draw on this in the research design which is outlined at the end of  this 
section. 
 
 
Fairclough’s Order of  Discourse Model 
 
‘Order of  discourse’ refers to the discursive constitution of  a social domain and the 
relationships between different discourses within it, a “structured totality” (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 105). These relationships are not clear cut; they overlap, interact, are 
contested and strengthened as conflicts and struggles for discursive control develop. The 
order of  discourse is divided into three levels for analysis. Each level identifies key features 
of  an order of  discourse, identifying trends, contradictions, and constrained choices made 
by the author of  the text. These levels appear in their original form as follows: 
 
1. Analysis of  texts (spoken, written, or involving a combination of  semiotic 
modalities, e.g. televisual texts); 
2. Analysis of  discourse practices of  text production, distribution, and 
consumption; 
3. Analysis of  social and cultural practices, which frame discourse practices and 
texts 
(Fairclough, 1998, p. 144). 
 
A predominant focus of  this method is intertextuality: “how in the production and 
interpretation of  a text people draw upon other texts and text types which are culturally 
available to them” (Fairclough, 1998, p. 143). The ‘order’ is constituted by “a structured 
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configuration of  genres and discourses associated with a given social domain” (Fairclough, 
1995, p. 145). 
 
I argue that the order of  discourse approach is the most appropriate for this project. The 
three state mode of  analysis leaves open the possibility for the adoption of  further 
methodological frameworks like those drawn from Wodak (2001). In the research design 
this lends the design a degree of  flexibility to explore the emergent and contradictory 
features of  neo-liberalisation.  
 
 
Foucault: Power and Governmentality  
 
The condition of  possibility of  power…should not be sought in the primary 
existence of  a central point, in a unique space of  sovereignty whence would radiate 
derivative and descendent forms; it is the moving base of  relations of  force that 
incessantly induce, by their inequality, states of  power, but always local and unstable 
(Foucault, 1998, p. 122). 
 
CDA recognises power in the way that texts are articulated, consumed and redeployed by 
authors in structured yet unstable ways. Authors of  speech or text are constituted by the 
conditions under which the they are created. The omnipresent nature of  power partly 
determines how discourses are deployed. However, I hedge against a complete adoption of  
Foucault’s conception of  power, maintaining that one can distinguish between discourses 
which are stabilized and those which are not, leaving open an understanding of  the way 
common sense and hegemony (examined shortly) operate.  
 
Governmentality (Foucault, 1991) can be characterised as an enquiry into the conditions 
required for government, the realization of  power in action. This is important for a critical 
understanding of  neo-liberalisation because:  
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The neo-liberal forms of  government feature not only direct intervention by means 
of  empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop 
indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time 
being responsible for them…As the choice of  options for action is…the 
expression of  free will on the basis of  a self-determined decision, the consequences 
of  the action are borne by the subject alone, who is also solely responsible for 
them. (Lemke, 2001, p. 201) 
 
Self-responsibility can be linked to the rise of  entrepreneurial discourses where 
responsibilities for production, welfare, and political life are relocated from the state to 
individuals or communities (Bondi & Lauri, 2005; Gamble, 2001; Harvey, 1989; Swales & 
Rogers, 1995). Rose suggests that an intellectual and practical break can partly explain this. 
People who were to be governed, in all their divergent subjectivities, were to be considered 
as individuals: 
 
Their responsibility was no longer to be understood as a relation of  obligation 
between citizen and society enacted and regulated through the mediating party of  
the state: rather, it was to be a relation of  allegiance and responsibility to those one 
cared about the most and to whom one’s destiny was linked. (Rose, 1996, p. 330) 
 
In New Zealand, shifting views of  society’s construction since the early 1980s reflects the 
“‘governmentalization of  the state” (Mckee, 2009, p. 470) through the growth of  non-state 
actors in the state apparatus. For example, District Health Boards are allocated funds for 
which a certain amount is deployed for ‘community’ services through not-for-profit 
organisations. Some previously centralised health services are now delivered through a 
range of  contractual relations with providers which take community as their point of  
departure. This suggests that communities can best decide which services are appropriate 
to their needs. This has its intuitive merit, but the implications for democratic 
accountability are less clear. The impetus for improvement, sustainability and quality of  the 
services remains within the purview of  state interest, yet beyond popular control.  
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While Foucault’s theories provide some useful insights for the critical examination of  
discourse, the degree to which his ideas are incorporated into research design is open. In 
CDA governmentality offers an explanatory framework for power. By laying bare the 
relations of  structural domination, power and governmentality show how actors within 
neo-liberalisation move from a citizenship based state to one in which subjects are 
decentralised and constituted through networks of  family and community relations. 
However, neo-liberalisation is implicit in a variety of  economic injustices which power 
relations alone cannot explain. The economic determinism of  neo-liberalisation demands a 
critique of  the means and way it produces particular types of  subjects and conditions. I 
argue that this can be explained by concepts of  ideology and hegemony.  
 
 
Ideology 
 
Ideologies “arise from and are transformed as parts of  the more basic condition of  the 
production and domination” (Mannheim, 1936, pp. 247-248). Drawing on Marx’s 
conception of  ideology as a superstructure disguising the exploitative nature of  capitalism, 
Mannheim demonstrated that whatever humans believe they know about the world is 
dependent upon their position in society. This position is structured according to the 
means of  production, leaving the question of  the subject as a productive agent untouched. 
“The subject was doomed to remain at the point of  programs and prolegomena [critical 
introduction]”; resistance to capitalism is thus rendered futile (Shills, 1974, p. 86). The 
question for Mannheim then revolved around which social standpoint vis-à-vis history give 
the best chance of  understanding the constitution of  ‘truth’. 
 
In this project I recognise ideology as a constraining force; it limits which discursive 
practices are possible through established norms and conventions (Fairclough, 1995). By 
extension, ideology also has a place in the articulation of  discursive action itself. It provides 
resources and conduits for the transmission of  ideas. This broadly follows Fairclough’s 
(1996) somewhat abstract positioning of  ideology as simply immanent within discourse.  
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The demarcation between ideology and discourse is concerned with representation. A 
fruitful approach is to note that ideology has a degree of  social currency not necessarily 
expressed directly. To recognise ideology in communication marks something of  an 
epistemological shift through a “displacement of  the real in favour of  the representational” 
(Holbow, 2012, p. 23), noting speakers’ constrained choices in representation, rather than 
taking them at their face value. Ideology is thus recognised as something to be traced 
within discourses.  
 
This basic view of  ideology complements governmentality through its position as a 
distorted way of  viewing and re-articulating the world within certain boundaries. However, 
governmentality and ideology fail to adequately account for their own perpetuation 
through history. Together they explain why neo-liberalisation may appear a certain way, but 
do not alone explain how it came to be dominant. This gap can be filled by Gramsci’s 
(1992) notion of  hegemony.  
 
 
Hegemony, common sense and the state apparatus 
 
Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of  one of  the fundamental 
economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but it is never 
achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an 'unstable equilibrium' 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 92) 
 
Fairclough’s description of  hegemony suggests that some ways of  constructing discourse 
are dominant while others remain peripheral, alternative or oppositional and that there is 
always struggle between them to a greater or lesser extent. This is useful because it reveals 
the roots of  instability apparent within the speeches I examine and the way combinations 
of  discourses are articulated in a struggle for hegemony. Here I am referring to 
interdiscursivity; the extent to which discursive practice draws on other fields of  social 
relations for coherence. When combined with intertextuality (the extent to which a text 
draws on other texts for coherence), one can begin to construct a framework for 
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understanding the unstable equilibrium of  hegemony, and thus the perpetuation of  
different types of  neo-liberalisation. 
 
Through the lens of  hegemony, the ideological functions of  neo-liberalisation take on the 
guise of  a tool of  oppression implemented by the ruling elite. The processes of  hegemony 
can be viewed as part of  a political project to “re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore the power of  economic elites” (Harvey, 2005, p. 19). 
 
Gramsci’s conception of  common sense, the ‘sense held in common’ (rather than good 
sense, a critical engagement with problems), offers a framework for understanding how 
hegemony operates.  The value of  Gramsci’s notion of  common sense lies in its ability to 
address the seemingly apolitical spaces generated by neo-liberalisation. Such spaces are 
represented as democratically unaccountable, answerable only to the abstract market forces 
through which they are sustained. Gramsci’s common sense is constituted by the false 
consciousness of  the working classes, identifying their own good with the good of  the 
market and thus the bourgeoisie.  
 
The advantage of  Gramscian constructions of  common sense and hegemony is that ideas 
are constantly made and remade to reflect the prevailing modes of  discourse and 
production. Common sense can be understood to reflect historical sedimentation, 
complete with the inconsistencies and contradictions inherent in market capitalism. In the 
context of  this project common sense and claims to apolitical ends are relatively easy to 
observe. As Rupert (2003, p. 185) notes, “Gramsci’s political project thus entailed 
addressing the popular common sense operative in particular times and places, making 
explicit the tensions and contradictions within it as well as the socio-political implications 
of  these”. Given that CDA often explores fairly obvious social problems, the insertion of  
hegemony can highlight the banal features of  political projects which often have unequal or 
coercive outcomes, making taken-for-granted political structures a target of  investigation.  
 
However, neo-liberalisation is more than a simple mode of  rule. If  Althusser (1971) is 
correct in holding that individuals’ desires, choices and judgements are a consequence of  
social practice, then the conditions for production and identity are not a priori, but  
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bounded within limited frameworks determined by ideological hegemony. The ‘ideological 
state apparatus’ (ISA) (Althusser, 1971) perpetuates the conditions necessary for subjects to 
learn their identity through ideological activity, inculcated through the news media, the 
family, education and other established institutions connected to everyday life. The ISA 
creates “the imaginary relationship of  individuals to their conditions of  existence” 
(Althusser, 1971, p. 162). For Althusser, there is not a system of  real relations, only their 
representations and materiality, obfuscating the exploitative and coercive features of  
capitalism.   
 
Hegemony and Althusser’s ISA thus provide useful plugins to this project:  
 
While the interpellation of  subjects is an Althusserian elaboration, there is in 
Gramsci a conception of  subjects as structured by diverse ideologies implicit in 
their practice which gives them a 'strangely composite' character, and a view of  
'common sense' as both a depositary of  the diverse effects of  past ideological 
struggles, and a constant target for restructuring, in ongoing struggles. (Fairclough, 
1995, p. 76) 
 
The composite nature of  hegemony and common sense overlaps with power and 
governmentality, positioning struggle as simultaneously repressing and enabling subjects in 
social action, though not always in ways consistent with their wishes or needs.   
 
 
Discourse 
 
The way authors of  discourse address neo-liberalisation, interpret and draw on it are 
requisite in its perpetuation and entrenchment. While ideology provides guiding structures, 
discourse provides the linguistic resources necessary to perpetuate and understand neo-
liberalisation.  
 
18 
 
Theories of  discourse can be deployed in a range of  ways to understand political problems 
in everyday life. Implicit in this work is Habermas’ (1981) Theory of  Communicative 
Action (TCA). Habermas explains the relationships between power, action and language, 
attempting to lay bare democratic ideals for communication. This suggests a concern for 
the effects of  power and that an awareness of  assumptions and distortions are a necessary 
condition for overcoming oppression.   
 
The TCA entails a number of  assumptions about the nature of  truth and the material 
world. Our experiences as active subjects can be shaped by the concealed actions of  power: 
  
Distorted communication in discourse occurs where people or organizations 
pursue their strategic interests rather than seeking understanding and ‘the best 
solution’ through reasoned debate. Identifying instances of  distorted 
communication or strategic action within texts can indicate the use of  power and 
persuasion in language (Bierre, Howden-Chapman, & Signal, 2010, p. 24) 
 
Thus, a speech which might appear as communicative action seeking consensus can be 
“covertly strategic action” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 214).  
 
Another key aspect of  discourse is the role it plays in the construction of  hegemony for 
which Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have developed a metalanguage. Some of  this I have used 
already: ‘Articulation’- establishing relations between things to construct their identity; 
‘moment’- the positions articulated within discourse; ‘nodal point’, constituting the partial 
fixation of  meaning within discourse to which other things can be related for meaning.  
 
In CDA the construction of  a nodal point is as much about what it is linked to as what is 
not. The detection or explanation of  moments or elements of  discourse that could be 
present, but are not is also central. This is important because every expression of  discursive 
action can be seen as a reduction in the possibilities for meaning. The fixation of  meaning 
is increasingly embedded in social relations across time, complete with original 
contradictions, nuances, inclusions or exclusions, forming an unstable hegemony.  
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To summarise, I adopt a framework of  discourse based on political struggle. Discourse is a 
conduit for ideology which is in turn seen as a mechanism for constructing hegemony. The 
way this is deployed by actors is a function of  Foucault’s power and governmentality, 
creating conditions of  possibility for unstable neo-liberalisation. Critical discourse analysis 
forms a framework for the analysis of  different moments in neo-liberalisation as unstable, 
shifting, and ultimately contestable.  
 
 
1.3  Research Design 
 
This section advances a three stage model of  CDA, broadly based on Fairclough’s order of  
discourse outlined earlier (Fairclough, 1995, 1998). I re-arrange Fairclough’s model to 
reflect the broad structure of  discursive practice, informed by both macro social processes 
and meso discursive practice. I also draw on Wodak’s work  for an analysis of  speakers’ 
representational choices, which are assumed to be an outcome of  ideology (Wodak, 2001).  
This framework enables a relatively flexible approach that charts a number of  emergent 
discursive and ideological features of  speeches and also attends to their historical contexts.  
 
The data in the following chapters is made up of  seven speeches delivered by the Prime 
Ministers of  New Zealand between 1984 and 2013; David Lange, Mike Moore, Geoffrey 
Palmer, Jim Bolger, Jenny Shipley, Helen Clark and John Key. Each speech was delivered in 
an election year where crises and ideological concerns were more likely to be highlighted. 
The substantive chapters are broadly divided according to Governtments rather than Prime 
Ministers. This is predominantly for structural simplicity, but also hints at a number of  
breaks and shifts in neo-liberalisation between governments as well as between leaders. 
 
The focus on political leadership assumes that the political elite have privileged access to 
discourses concerned with democratic processes and the structural adjustment of  the state 
apparatus. While hedging against a Hobbesian view of  power, I suggest that this privileged 
access results in a degree of  coercion, informed by Prime Ministers’ ideologies. As experts 
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in the exercise of  sovereignty, political leaders have privileged access to the discourses of  
rule when compared to the majority of  citizens.  
 
I begin the analysis at a broad level with an examination of  the discursive order itself, the 
identification of  broad themes within the text and how these fit with recent shifts in social 
structure. I ask questions about the function of  the speech at the time of  delivery -
particularly, what historical processes limit some utterances and but encourage others? How 
might these processes be explained in light of  the hegemony, governmentality or other 
concepts of  sociological relevance? What is the author’s context and how does it affect the 
text? What is it about their discursive context that compels authors to speak in this way? 
What broad trends or ideas are being represented here and are they necessary to the wider 
social order? 
 
Secondly, I examine the discursive practice of  the speakers, identifying key passages and 
phrases. What do these phrases refer to? How do they mirror government policy (if  at all)? 
What do they say about a distinct moment in neo-liberalisation? To what extent does the 
author draw on other texts? What are the examples of  this and how to they direct the text? 
To what extent does the text incorporate themes and ideas from other fields of  practice? 
To what extent does this indicate social change or stability? Why are these phrases 
important? What do they say about neo-liberalisation and political history in New Zealand? 
 
The final level of  analysis involves a close examination of  some technical components of  
each speech (Wodak, 2001). This level is descriptive and based on Halliday’s (1967-8) 
transitive theory. Drawing explicitly on the work of  van Leeuwen (1995) and Hopper and 
Thompson (1980), transitivity is a framework for understanding the ways social action is 
represented in texts. I describe how the actions of  people, groups, and markets are 
represented as active or passive and what this might say about the speakers’ ideological 
positions. Representational choices are important in neo-liberalisation because they lend 
speeches their ‘effect’ by constructing particular views of  reality, which is informed by 
ideology. This section of  the analyses is of  course not exhaustive. For the sake of  brevity I 
examine just a few excerpts from each speech to support the other two levels of  analyses. 
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A final part of  each analysis will be devoted to a short section evaluating the overall effect 
of  the text, charting its position in neo-liberalisation and its possible relationships to the 
other speakers in the broadest terms.  
 
It should be noted that these analyses do not claim a complete knowledge of  neo-
liberalising discursive practice. This is not an exhaustive analysis and merely points to a 
more nuanced and detailed consideration of  neo-liberalisation in New Zealand. I seek to 
resist a monolithic treatment of  neo-liberalisation while simultaneously suggesting a degree 
of  resistance to its outcomes. While providing a useful departure, this cannot be achieved 
through discourse analysis alone.  
 
 
Limitations 
 
The key conceptual weakness faced by the orders of  discourse model is in a separation of  
discursive and non-discursive action. Lacalau and Mouffe’s (1985) theory of  the social 
understands all action as discursive, while Fairclough places an ambiguous distinction 
between social and material actions. How to go about unpacking these distinctions within 
social relations is just as unclear as how one might attend to the relations between them. 
One cannot easily demonstrate that these relations influence each other, or that they exist.  
 
The distinction between material and discursive action is manifested through the 
representation of  broad social trends as the background to discursive action. This is 
overcome in some ways by the implicitly comparative nature of  the project, showing how 
the struggle for control over discourse is an on-going process, fraught with instability and 
contradiction. The problem can also be overcome by treating the distinction between 
discursive and material as analytical. Research pointing to distinctions between discursive 
and non-discursive moments simply yields different results. The outcome of  this can be 
reflected in analytical choice rather than theoretical logics.  
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The second problem is the extent to which people have control over their use of  language 
and thus the formation of  subjectivity and agency. This is reflected in a lack of  attention to 
the consumption of  texts, with CDA focusing overwhelmingly on their production. In 
some ways this does limit my conclusions, based around the social practice of  discursive 
production. To be re-articulated and understood, texts must first be consumed. 
 
 
1.4  Summary of  Analyses  
 
The following chapters examine seven speeches delivered by New Zealand’s last seven 
Prime Ministers. Through a critical examination of  these speeches I argue that neo-
liberalisation in New Zealand does not constitute a monolithic ideology or a set of  stable 
political practices. Though there are some consistencies, there are also contradictions, 
conflicts and other unexpected breaks. There are some interesting and poignant moments 
to be examined, which set this work apart from much of  the existing literature on the 
structures of  neo-liberalisation. While many of  the conclusions are tentative and open to 
argument or interpretation, I hold that each of  the seven speeches examined are indicative 
of  specific moments in the neo-liberalisation of  New Zealand.  
 
 
Fourth Labour Government: 1984-1990 
 
The fourth Labour Government was elected off  the back of  widespread discontent 
surrounding Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s leadership. There were crises within a 
Government already located at the fringes of  Keynesianism and a number of  economic 
controls had already been removed by the 1984 election. The most obvious features of  the 
fourth Labour Government’s policy were organised around monetarist economics. This 
phase in the neo-liberalisation of  New Zealand can be partially characterised as a roll-back 
(Peck & Tickell, 2002) approach to neo-liberalisation. The removal of  farming subsidies, 
foreign exchange controls and import tariffs indicated a push to remove key components 
of  state control over markets. While the bulk of  the fourth Labour Government’s reform 
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remained outside the welfare state, many of  the structural adjustments had distressing 
impacts on the poor and marginalised. 
 
David Lange’s 1987 speech reveals the relatively unstable nature of  neo-liberalisation. This 
is apparent in the ways he mixes discourses of  economic management with those of  the 
free market. There are a number of  contradictions where ‘no alternative’ to market led 
policies are represented, yet the very conditions of  possible substitutes become evident 
with his articulations of  fairness and economic management.  
 
A speech delivered by Geoffrey Palmer positions him as the technocrat of  neo-
liberalisation in New Zealand. Palmer was largely responsible for the legislative program 
behind the policies deployed by Minister of  Finance Roger Douglas under David Lange 
(Hayward, 2004). Palmer’s technocratic approach has the effect of  shifting discourses of  
democratic process from lay to expert knowledge. There are also some contradictions 
surrounding the positioning of  the Treaty of  Waitangi and the institutionalisation of  
ethnicity. Palmer’s wish to institutionalise Treaty grievances sits uncomfortably with a wider 
push to decentralise the state in many areas of  public administration.   
 
Mike Moore was only in power for a few weeks, yet his speech reveals some features 
worthy of  note. He articulates a discourse of  health and illness in relation to economic 
performance in its completeness. The suggestion of  ‘no pain, no gain’ is examined, 
revealing a number of  tendencies to naturalise market forces which occurs with increasing 
frequency throughout the following speakers. Moore also articulates the “battler” as an 
idealised citizen, raising some interesting questions about New Zealand’s position as a 
settler colony and an entrepreneurial society.  
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Fourth National Government: 1990-1999 
 
The 1990s in New Zealand were dominated by the fourth National Government’s 
distinctive approaches to social policy. The outgoing Labour caucus was increasingly 
characterised by internal contradiction. Dissent and disagreement tore the Government 
apart, leaving Geoffrey Palmer in a caretaker’s position, only to be rolled by Mike Moore 
two months before the election. Still recovering from the effects of  the 1987 share market 
crash, the National Government continued to roll-back core state services. Financialised 
mobile capital and social spending cuts filled out an election manifesto which promised to 
restore the “decent society”. The sale of  state owned enterprises and assets dominated 
while Treaty of  Waitangi issues continued to plague the Government after an end all ‘fiscal 
envelope’ package was rejected by iwi negotiators.  
 
Jim Bolger’s position within neo-liberalisation is marked by his fallout with Finance 
Minister Ruth Richardson over the adoption of  further market led reforms (pejoratively 
labelled “Ruthanasia”). Bolger’s articulation of  the “decent society” is examined, noting his 
communitarian turn. The appearance of  communitarianism reveals an interesting 
relationship with market logic, proving remarkably compatible with prevailing political 
trends of  the time.  
 
The 1997 speech delivered Jenny Shipley reveals a strong discourse of  entrepreneurialism, 
suggesting a number of  assumptions around the competitive nature of  society. Shipley also 
deployed the Code of  Social and Family Responsibility which placed an emphasis on social 
capital as an aim of  economic development and the responsibilisation of  families, 
reflecting the liberal dilemma of  the family as both a public and private space. The Code is 
also implicit in the decentralisation of  the state as a guarantor of  social security and an 
increasingly apparent attempt to balance the needs of  the population against the needs of  
the market.  
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Fifth Labour Government: 1999-2008 
 
The fifth Labour Government can be broadly characterised by a ‘constructive’ or ‘inclusive’ 
moment in the neo-liberalisation of  New Zealand. This is organised around the adoption 
of  frameworks of  inclusion (such as education) within a priori markets logics. The central 
tenets of  the market are taken for granted and citizens are increasingly encouraged to 
participate in these frameworks through state supported schemes. The removal of  interest 
from new student loans, an increase in minimum wage and the extension of  ICT 
technology to rural areas are examples of  this. This is broadly labelled the ‘Third Way’ 
through an attempt to transcend left and right political logics (Giddens, 1998). The Third 
Way style of  the fifth Labour Government appeared to soften neo-liberalisation by 
attempting to ‘equip’ people for a harsh globalised world. However, the structural 
adjustment of  the last two decades were regarded as inevitable and unchallengeable and 
were thus entrenched in both state and private institutions (Roper, 2011). 
 
Helen Clark was New Zealand’s first elected female Prime Minister and strongly aligned 
with the Third Way. Clark’s articulation of  the “job-seeker” as an entrepreneurial subject, 
the “knowledge economy” as an imaginary construct, and “human capital” as a factor of  
production are each investigated. The Treaty of  Waitangi and “closing the gaps” between 
Maori vis-à-vis others is also examined in some detail.  
 
 
Fifth National Government: 2008-2013 
 
The fifth National Government emerged from the financial problems generated by the 
2008 global recession. While Labour’s handling of  Treaty related politics had been 
undermined, the collapse and costs of  financed capital made inclusive neo-liberalism 
increasingly unpopular. The National Government’s first term was predominantly 
organised around international financial affairs. Unpopular cuts taken elsewhere in the 
world were publically resisted by the government which emphasised responsible fiscal 
management. The language of  credit rating agencies also entered the political lexicon in 
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2011, marking the private regulation of  public markets and the development of  markets as 
a stable logic for governing. 
 
The National Government’s second term paved the way for a flattening of  tax 
(spearheaded by an increase in GST), the partial sale of  state owned enterprises, and cuts in 
many areas of  government spending. The 2008 recession enabled a largely popular 
government to engage in the types of  policies it would probably have pursued regardless. 
Widespread cuts to state spending were justified against an attempt to get “back in black” 
and “build a brighter future”, while promoting compulsory drug testing and optional 
(though encouraged) contraception for female beneficiaries and their daughters. 
 
The fifth National Government’s approach to rule is represented by Prime Minister John 
Key as anti-ideological. Key claimed openly that he is “not interested in following a 
particular ideology”. I examine the limitations of  his position, noting its implications for 
wider government policy. The term “mum and dad investor” and “kiwi” are also examined, 
noting the way that share market investment is positioned as social security, suggesting the 
development of  a market ideology as a rubric for governing.  
 
The following chapters flesh these summaries out in detail, noting where and why 
significant moments might occur. Overall, I argue that neo-liberalisation in New Zealand is 
diverse, shifting, contradictory, and resistible. Despite claims to the contrary, there are 
alternatives. These are to be noted in the very tensions I set about exposing.  
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2.  The Fourth Labour Government, 1984-1990: Instability and 
 Contradiction 
 
The fourth Labour Government is commonly positioned as the initiator of neo-
liberalisation in New Zealand. While some structural adjustments had been made prior to 
1984, the Labour Government followed the monetarist agenda put forward by Minister of 
Finance Roger Douglas, who drew readily on the market led theories of Milton Freidman 
(Smith, 2005). After a snap election the Government immediately reduced the value of the 
New Zealand dollar by 20 per cent. Exchange controls were removed and the dollar floated 
in quick succession (Kelsey, 1995). 
 
The Reserve Bank Act 1989 formed the lynch pin for price stability, allowing those in 
control of the Reserve Bank to pursue anti-inflationary measures outside democratic 
controls. The following analyses juxtapose this approach with the fourth Labour 
Government’s more contradictory features, showing the unstable and contradictory nature 
of neo-liberalisation. 
 
 
2.1  David Lange: The Shape of the Future, 1987 
 
This speech is a sequel to others delivered in 1985 and 1986, noting key policy changes for 
the term ahead. The Government went into the 1987 election with a broad promise to 
balance the radical monetarism of the previous term with an attention to social policy, after 
strong public reactions and threats of dissent within the party. Lange charts some specific 
Government policy, including the separation of commercial and non-commercial functions 
of state owned enterprises, the decentralisation of employment relations, and a broad 
continuation of existing unemployment support. There are also some general remarks 
which separate social and economic change. This is significant because it represents part of 
a break with previous goals of full employment and social security.  
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David Lange; Discursive Order 
 
Lange mainly concentrates on the economic reforms which his Government engaged in 
over the last term. The order of discourse is dominated by the sweeping failures of the 
Muldoon Government and the inevitability of change, thus rendering a globalised and 
monetarist approach to government beyond democratic control:  
 
Acceptance of the need for change was widespread…Because change had been so 
long delayed, New Zealand would have to put what should have been two or three 
decades of gradual adjustment into the space of three to five years 
 
Lange speaks most significantly about the ‘roll-back’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002) features of 
Government policy. He articulates them in terms of New Zealand’s future of 
entrenchment in international networks of competition and calculable exchange, rather 
than the controversies which result from rolling-back the state: 
 
Export volumes are forecast to grow by 2.5 per cent this year and continue to grow 
in 1988…Many bureaucratic controls and restrictions which have hampered 
performance in the past will be gone. The emphasis will be on results rather than 
on detailed rules of governing how they are achieved 
 
While articulations of globality and competition might have been recognisable at the time 
(Thatcherism and Reaganomics were recent developments) they are far from stabilized, 
which can be read as leading to more general statements of a “fair society” based on choice 
and freedom: “The Government will continue to pursue a policy in 1987 which identifies 
constraints and removes them and puts resources into helping people take advantage of 
opportunity”. 
 
The framing of “opportunity” reflects a tension between freedom and equality where 
market competition sits uncomfortably with quests for inclusion and social cohesion. For 
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Lange this tension is linked to the removal of bureaucracy. It is positioned as negative 
freedom, freedom from the state apparatus and freedom to pursue one’s goals over 
pursuing equality per se.  
 
Elsewhere in the speech, issues of welfare, employment, and disadvantage in relation to 
ethnicity and age are further framed in terms of individual “opportunity” rather than 
collective equality. This is somewhat at odds with Lange’s concern for the “little guy”, 
noted during the 1984 Leaders’ debate with Robert Muldoon (NZ Onscreen, 2010). 
 
In a further contradiction, Lange recognises the fourth Labour Government’s approach to 
reform as “a steady and consistent course of economic management”, positioning market 
led economics as a type of management in itself despite his push to remove bureaucracy.  
This can be taken to reflect the relatively recent uptake of market led approaches to 
government and the partial construction of an unstable hegemony where contradictions in 
meaning are folded into emergent discursive action.  
 
This partly mirrors the 1987 Treasury briefing paper for the incoming Government titled 
“Government Management” (Treasury, 1987). The paper is fairly radical in its suggestions 
for governing. For example, giving the public sector “freedom to manage” the labour 
market results in a recommendation for further market de-regulation, though the shape 
that policy should take was not given (Treasury, 1987, p. 172).  
 
Lange’s speech occupies a pertinent moment in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand. It 
falls at the end of an era of managed economic affairs and near the beginning of 30 years of 
market led government. The range of ideas that Lange deploys in his 1987 speech reveal 
some contradictions. A separation of equality and opportunity and the simultaneous 
articulation of free market logics in frameworks of management mark some of these. Such 
articulations are absent from future speeches, suggesting a degree of discursive instability. 
However the basic frameworks of emergent market led government and its discursive 
apparatus are present.  
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David Lange; Discursive Practice 
 
There are a number of discursive practices of note in this speech. I focus on Lange’s 
articulation of ‘TINAisms’ (‘there is no alternative’) and the concept of “management” in a 
free market framework. These support the interpretation of Lange’s uptake of market logic 
as relatively incomplete and sometimes contradictory.  
 
Throughout the speech Lange suggests that structural adjustment is inevitable, supported 
by the representation of change itself as inevitable: “Because the price signals of external 
markets were hidden from New Zealand producers for so long, the need for adjustment is 
all the more pressing”. This statement reveals a degree of slippage between “description 
and prescription” (Fairclough, 2011, p. 13). The first part is a representation of world ‘as it 
really is’ and the second is ‘this is what we must do’. The strategy of representing a state of 
affairs as a policy objective gives grounding to the performative nature of neo-liberalisation 
and the way market logic can be seen to “bring into being the very realities it describes” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, in Fairclough, 2011, p. 14). This suggests that Lange represents an 
ideological position as reality.  
 
The descriptive nature of the world as it is and the prescriptive policies that result from it 
can be related to the relationship between the universal and the particular. Lange’s way of 
textualising this relationship, against the widespread “acceptance for change”, stands in 
contrast with ways in which “the relationship between universal blueprints and the radically 
diverse contexts is experienced” (Fairclough, 2011, p. 16). 
 
Fairclough (2011, p. 16) notes that the slippage between prescription and description lends 
ideological meaning to political problems, which in turn affects their discursive framing; 
“advocacy of universal panaceas without analysis of differences of circumstances which 
may affect their appropriacy and impacts can be profoundly damaging”. The effects of 
such articulations are well documented. Harvey (2005) argues that the practice of 
representing policy objectives with no alternative as congruent with a given state of affairs 
is implicit in the construction of consent, and thus the construction of neo-liberalisation as 
a natural regulation of the social order. 
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A similar slippage can be detected in relation to employment policy. The first statement 
represents conditions ‘as they really are’ and the second provides a policy response: 
 
It is clear that economic change has influenced and generally strengthened the 
attitude of employers towards wage bargaining.  
 
This very process of change increases the need for trade unions to restructure so 
they are able to compete effectively 
 
Lange’s articulation above is a partial contradiction of the promise to restore compulsory 
unionism going into the 1984 election. While compulsory unionism was re-introduced in 
1985, the Labour Relations Act 1987 changed the way that unions were structured and 
operated in relation to their members. New minimum membership requirements decreased 
the number of smaller unions, while those with 10,000 or more members increased in size 
and number. This meant that advocacy on behalf of specific issues became more difficult 
and some unions were seen as less accountable to members (Kelsey, 1995). Many weaker 
unions had folded by the time Lange delivered his 1987 speech and still more were required 
to restructure, merge or otherwise rationalise. While this may not have been the complete 
overhaul desired by some, it exacerbated a climate of fear surrounding job security and 
tipped bargaining power in favour of employers (Kelsey, 1995).  
 
Slippage between the descriptive and prescriptive is not constant throughout the speech, 
perhaps reflecting the relatively recent uptake of neo-liberalising discourses. Similarly, 
Lange’s articulation of market de-regulation as “management” in itself can be read as a 
contradiction, reflecting the relatively recent transition to market led governing.  
 
The discourse of “management” in Lange’s speech parallels those of Treasury briefing 
papers released earlier that year. The overlap in discursive action between the two 
articulations is significant, though not identical, further suggesting instability. For example:  
 
Unless the regulatory framework is flexible and permissive enough to allow 
adaptation to changing conditions, the consequences will be felt in continuing high 
levels of unemployment…and poor economic performance. (Treasury, 1987, p. 
270) 
 
32 
 
A regulatory framework, rather than a lack thereof, is recognised as key to the 
decentralisation of markets. While Lange suggests that: 
  
When the Government committed itself to a new approach to economic 
management it also committed itself to a thorough going process of administrative 
reform which would enhance performance in the economy…Many bureaucratic 
controls which have hampered performance in the past will be gone 
 
Lange’s quote above and others like it throughout the speech represent contradictions 
within a market led approach to governing, resulting in the representation of a market state 
rather than a small state. The articulation of “management” in connection to the removal 
of bureaucracy is an uncomfortable one, which would eventually be exposed in an 
ideological split between Lange and Minister of Finance Roger Douglas, leading to a 
leadership crisis and the loss of the 1990 general election. In general, the social reality 
promulgated by Lange is one where particular representations of universal change create a 
range of seemingly inevitable policy prescriptions. This is partly achieved through rigid 
articulation of relationships between the universal and the particular.  
 
 
David Lange; Transitive Order 
 
This section gives some tentative indications of how selected  features of Lange’s speech 
combine to represent market led structural adjustment as a matter of urgency and necessity. 
The way markets and people are positioned supports this, eliding human resistance in 
favour of overwhelming market forces: “The Labour market is made up of a series of 
transactions which determine  people’s livelihoods” 
 
This is but one possible representation of how the “labour market” is constructed. The 
actions of that constitute the labour market -“transactions”- lacks participants other than 
those who are reliant on them “for their livelihoods”. The human action “labour” which 
make up “transactions” are hidden within the folds of “the labour market”. The lack of 
agency is somewhat telling. There is no action carried from one actor to another, no 
question of volition and no obvious transitional phase between inception and completion 
of actions; “transactions” simply occur without human interaction. The actions of people 
in “the labour market” and their “transactions” are thus de-activated; they are represented 
as if they are statistics or ‘things’ rather than dynamic actions.  
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Not only does this position people as part of “the labour market” as relatively powerless, 
but also backgrounds the very democratic processes by which labour market “transactions” 
were supposed to have taken place. Under this framework all “transactions” are given the 
same value and meaning, which as the Employment Relations Act 1987 (noted earlier) 
shows, was not always the case.  
 
Further to this, the way Lange focuses on “transactions” as the founding component of 
“the labour market” represents a particular kind of generalisation, made possible by the 
lack of agency and powerlessness outlined above. The establishment of transactions as a 
temporal (rather than spatial) activity of the labour market requires a classification between 
calculation (transactions) and human behaviour (production). The classification of 
“transactions” only goes so far; it does not reveal how or why transactions function, nor 
indeed the ways in which they can be said to determine peoples’ livelihoods. This suggests 
that some aspects of action are being represented at the expense of others. The shifting 
power relations between employers and employees are hidden behind an agentless 
framework of heterogeneous transactions, without any obvious resistance or 
empowerment.  
 
Further to the statement above, Lange asserts: “That does not mean that the labour market 
should float helplessly on the economic current”. This suggests that the Government still 
has a role to play in regulating the employment market, yet it does little to challenge the 
naturalisation of market forces, achieved through “float helplessly”. The naturalisation of 
“float” is linked to “discourses of rise and fall, ebb and flood” (van Leeuwen, 1995, p. 99) 
which are characterised by a lack of control. Similarly the action of “helplessly” is limited 
by its incomplete and totalising nature, one cannot say “helplessed” and one is not 
voluntarily or only partly helpless. 
 
These features combine to lend Lange’s statements an air of inevitability, supporting the 
Government’s policy prescriptions of imposing market oriented regulation on parts of the 
state apparatus. A key observation here is that the air of inevitability excludes alternative 
action; there can be no question of resistance to the re-regulations which Lange’s 
Government imposes because they are represented as reacting to apparently inevitable 
forces. 
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Discussion and Summary 
 
The discursive order of Lange’s 1987 speech “The Shape of the Future” is situated in the 
midst of rapid and radical economic reform. Lange is authored by these changes to a 
relatively high degree, recognising the position of international networks of competition 
that New Zealand is in as a result. However, this is somewhat offset in its totality by 
Lange’s suggestion of “management” in market led economic affairs, a theme notably 
absent from future speeches in this project.  
 
Lange’s discursive practice is primarily marked by a slippage between the description of 
states of affairs and a resulting policy prescription. This creates a framework which offers 
no alternative ways forward other than those he suggests. I also traced the way this 
framework operated through some of Lange’s transitive representations. I noted that Lange 
tended to represent market forces as inevitable, foreclosing a range of possible policy 
responses to material problems in favour of a market led approach. 
 
These observations give some indication of how discourses of neo-liberalisation gained 
traction. Apart from the speed with which the fourth Labour Government initiated 
structural adjustment, the discourses associated with these changes allowed alternatives to 
be neutralised, subsumed, or hidden. The ‘no alternative’ framework has received much 
attention, particularly surrounding Margaret Thatcher (Hall, 1989). However, Lange’s 
speech contains some distinctions, positioning regional and local development as they key 
to economic growth. This represents a strong contrast with future speakers, particularly Jim 
Bolger, who controversially positioned New Zealand within an Asian trading bloc and later 
John Key, who pursues an “ambitious free trade agenda” with an international focus. The 
‘no alternative’ discourse is bound to remind of Fukuyama’s (1992) infamous ‘End of 
History’ thesis, signalling the death of ideology. Yet, the instabilities of the 2008 financial 
crisis and the benefit of hindsight suggest that ‘no alternative’ approaches like Lange’s 
remain relatively incomplete, reliant on the ruins of the state structures he builds upon.  
 
The deregulation of the labour market, for example, relies on a discursive apparatus that 
takes the foundations of embedded unionism as a point of departure. Compulsory 
unionism was removed in 1983, replaced again in 1985 and then adjusted in 1987, framed 
each time in terms of inevitability and for the greater good of the New Zealand economy.  
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Another notable contradiction within the fourth Labour Government’s employment 
market reform concerned the position of women. Lange speaks readily about the 
bargaining position of people as individuals, as entrepreneurial subjects able to negotiate 
employment under market conditions. However, such a position undermines the 
bargaining positions of women, who were over represented in low pay and low status jobs. 
Lange’s universal representation of the labour market as simple “transactions” are marked 
by a contradiction of inclusiveness and coercive market logics, reflected in the relatively late 
adoption of the Employment Equity Bill in 1989. The bill would have legislated for a 
degree of income equality, but gave little enforceable leverage and was repealed soon after 
the National party won the 1990 election (Kelsey, 1995).  
 
These examples are important because they form a material backdrop to Lange’s speech. 
Neo-liberalisation has long been criticised (Harvey, 2005; O'Brien & Wilkes, 1993) for 
producing gaps between rhetoric and practice. The ‘no alternative’ position articulated by 
Lange is no exception. I argue that the contradictions and incompleteness within the 
speech suggests that real alternatives did exist (by exploiting the suggestion of 
“management” for example), also necessarily incomplete in nature, but diverging from the 
monetarist logics often proposed under Lange’s leadership. 
 
There are also a few theoretical remarks which can be made surrounding Lange’s speech 
and its relation to the trajectory of neo-liberalisation in New Zealand. One possible 
connection to make is between Lange’s articulations and Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) 
‘The New Spirit of Capitalism’. This suggests that a ‘justificatory regime’ began to emerge 
sometime in the 1980s as part of a change in the ‘spirit’ of capitalism. This emphasises the 
stimulating, secure, and fair parameters of capitalism which is particularly notable in 
Lange’s framing of “opportunity” over equality.  
 
Through concepts like “opportunity” a general standard is established, against which 
people are evaluated according to their flexibility, adaptability, face to face interaction, and 
“capacity to generate enthusiasm” (Fairclough, 2011, p. 3). This is reliant on a previous set 
of principles of equivalency (rigidity, tradition, inflexibility and so on), and so a framework 
of “no alternative” begins. If one is not new, enthusiastic and ready to grasp “opportunity”, 
one is old, inflexible and inefficient.  
 
The fact that such a pattern emerges off the back of several years of rolling-back the state 
apparatus suggests that there is indeed something ‘new’ about the spirit of capitalism that 
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Lange evokes. This asserts something more about ideology than a simple superstructure to 
capitalism, which is responsible for identifying the well-being of the bourgeoisie and the 
exploitation of working classes as one and the same.  
 
The ‘new spirit’ which Boltanski and Chiapello posit does more than simply identify these 
benefits as equivalent. It provides space for dissent and critique. Under Lange’s positioning 
of opportunity subjects have the opportunity to pursue their own ends, free from state and 
collective interference, encouraging the internalisation of entrepreneurialism. The ‘spirit’ 
which invokes a certain degree of excitement, security, and fairness, can also be noted in 
the work of later speakers, especially in the suggestion by Jenny Shipley in 1997, of the 
country that “likes to win”.  
 
Entrepreneurialism would be increasingly appealed to as part of everyday life, as Nairn and 
Higgins (2007) reveal in their study of young New Zealanders who were born in the late 
1980s. Such features of the ‘new spirit’ are increasingly complete in discourses deployed 
under ‘creative’ regimes of neo-liberalisation, like those of Helen Clark, where frameworks 
for participation and engagement are rolled-out in the form of education and 
interconnected technology 
 
The content of Lange’s speech is predominantly focused on questions of economic growth, 
price stability, and anti-inflationary measures. This overwhelming focus would undermine 
his relationship with his cabinet, eventually leading to his downfall.  
 
 
 
2.2  Geoffrey Palmer: Statement to Parliament, 1990  
 
In this speech Geoffrey Palmer’s technocratic leadership style is highlighted. The general 
thrust of the speech is concerned with technical features of government and the legislative 
changes he oversaw while a Member of Parliament.  
 
Interestingly for a valedictory at a time of crisis within the Labour Party, Palmer makes no 
direct reference to the types of radical market-led politics adopted by his colleagues and 
predecessors, the legislative programme for which he was largely responsible.  He instead 
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focuses on drawing a line between politics and the practice of governing, seeking to 
establish a position free of ideology. He creates what Greisman and Ritzer (1981, p. 35) call 
a “completely  functional  and  antiseptic  place” where rules and structures are beyond 
democratic control. He would later note that: 
 
Ideology…is frequently irrelevant in the operation of the main political parties, 
except perhaps in the sense of trying to maintain some sort of primitive tribal 
loyalty… pragmatism was always much more powerful (Palmer, 1992 in; Hayward, 
2004, p. 181)  
 
Some of the more significant discursive elements that Palmer deploys, particularly around 
institutionalising the Treaty of Waitangi, are at odds with the market led reform he 
supervised during his time as Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. For example, the 
introduction of the Reserve Bank Act 1989, allowing the reserve bank to act autonomously 
and the sale of Telecom to a consortium of local and overseas purchasers signalled every 
intention to continue the reforms initiated by David Lange’s cabinet.  
 
 
Geoffrey Palmer; Discursive Order 
 
Instead of reproducing a discursive arrangement that had developed around monetarist 
economics (as Lange did), Palmer represents his political career as a form of technocratic 
management. The deployment of rigid rules and regulations can be argued to normalise 
expert knowledge, positioning market logic beyond democratic control.  
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s provided a rich lexicon for political action, following two 
terms of radical reform and social change.  Palmer however appears unable to draw on this 
for the sake of the leadership controversy he was captured within. This involved the 
fracture of a largely dysfunctional cabinet who were divided on the monetary reforms 
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initiated by Roger Douglas. Palmer instead represents the changes of the last few years as a 
matter of technical concern.  
 
It is true that the standard of debate has declined in recent years because issues are 
not joined…The question of Government is one thing; the question of politics is 
another. 
 
The isolation of politics from legislative practice can be read as part of a conceptual 
apparatus where the establishment of government as a matter of technical expertise reflects 
the decentralization of democratic process; a move from popular to expert political 
participation and state to market led government (Crozier, Huntingdon, & Watanuki, 
1975).  
 
It can be argued that Palmer plays a part in this movement. Palmer’s position as deputy 
Prime Minister under Lange was one of managing the trajectory of reform; he was largely 
responsible for bringing Roger Douglas’ vision to reality in legislation. I argue that by not 
openly attending to the ideological processes of market re-regulation since 1984, Palmer 
inadvertently perpetuates market logic as an increasingly hegemonic rubric for governing.  
 
Palmer is one of two leaders in this project to mention the Treaty of Waitangi and the only 
to represent it as a matter of justice:  
 
One of the great difficult issues of New Zealand politics in the past decade has 
been…the issue of how to deal with the Treaty of Waitangi and issues relating to 
Maori that come from that. Those issues cannot be ignored; institutional means 
have to be found to address them, and justice has to be done.  
 
The attempt to incorporate Treaty issues and ethnicity into the state apparatus have been 
argued to secure the neutralisation of Maori grievances (Kelsey, 1991), a move which also 
sits uncomfortably with broader moves to decentralise the state in many areas of 
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government. The liberalisation of markets and the increasingly rigorous focus on resolving 
historic treaty claims were irreconcilable, revealing contradictions in the colonial project 
itself, where Maori grievances were discussed but not solved (Kelsey, 1991). 
 
The institutionalisation of the Treaty also supported the establishment of a number of pro-
market organisations like Te Whanau o Waipareira Trust and other entities representing the 
interests of well-established iwi: 
 
 For some, these urban Maori authorities were the prototype of a new form of de 
 facto tribal establishment.  For others, they were simply an extension of that vein in 
 Maori society that was endlessly adaptable to changes in the environment.  
 (Moon, 2009, p. 27) 
 
As well as the establishment of pro-market organisations, the institutionalisation of the 
Treaty also concerned the adoption of Maori customs, knowledge, and workers into the 
state apparatus through the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the establishment of the 
Waitangi Tribunal (Kelsey, 1991). This would later be folded into contemporary 
interpretations of rangatiratanga (self-determination) and rebound in favour of self-
governance and community ‘partnerships’ under Helen Clark’s Third Way. For Palmer 
though, institutionalisation remained a relative impossibility through an ideological clash 
with a push for state decentralisation.  
 
Palmer’s speech is thus constrained and enabled by several years of radical reform and its 
legislative backdrop of rules and regulations. The emergence of the Treaty of Waitangi as a 
significant item on the Government agenda (Barrett & Connolly-Stone, 1998) also reveals 
some contradictions within the program of marked led structural adjustment.  
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Geoffrey Palmer; Discursive Practice 
 
Palmer articulates a range of technocratic functions of government, which suggests a high 
degree of interdiscursivity. Palmer constructs much of his speech by formally referencing 
other texts (predominantly regulations) and drawing on a discourse which originates in 
positivism (McKenna & Graham, 2000). As author of some of these regulations and 
steward of others, he is able to construct and mediate them in particular ways, revealing his 
privileged access to discourses of government.  
 
Palmer’s position as an authoritative speaker is supported by a number of established 
technical frameworks, such as: “Imperial Laws Application Act, the National Development 
Act Repeal Act, the Economic Stabilisation Act Repeal Act, and the Public Safety 
Conservation Act Repeal Act”. 
 
Representing these ultimately political regulations under their technical labels elides their 
ideological origins. The “Economic Stabilisation Act Repeal Act”, for example, repealed 
the ability of cabinet to stabilise economic affairs. This was used primarily as a post-war 
price stabilization mechanism where wages and other indicators were structured 
institutionally. While used to freeze wages, its wider economic controls reflected the 
Keynesian condition of post-war politics. The aim of the repeal act was to remove such 
decisions from political (and thus democratic) control.  
 
The political backdrop of regulations like the Stabilisation Repeal Act is well documented, 
as are their effects on the New Zealand population (see Kelsey, 1995; Roper, 1992, for 
example). But the identification of a technocratic discourse like Palmer’s is important for 
three reasons.  
 
Firstly, Palmer has privileged access to the technical discourses of government, more so 
than the people who would be affected by such technicalities. His articulations are drawn 
from his extensive involvement in law and regulatory practice, which can be argued to 
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construct unequal access to discourses of governing, excluding by default those beyond 
networks of technocratic knowledge.   
 
Secondly, I suggest that the deployment of a technocratic discourse manipulates the 
position that Palmer’s speech occupies in the discursive order. Palmer’s leadership was a 
somewhat chequered one, leading a largely dysfunctional party towards a controversial 
election. Articulations like the ones analysed here have the effect of representing “highly 
contentious’ statements as ‘uncontentious’–often, indeed, as fact” (McKenna & Graham, 
2000, p. 248), with the effect of foreclosing resistance or argument.  
 
Finally, technocratic language is by nature imbued with a high degree of intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity. Palmer specifically articulates a number of regulations which are formed 
by rigid rules. These are arguably grounded in aspects of scientific discourse, of “the lexico-
grammars of managerialism, the military, and of religion, in particular, that of the 
scholastics” (Philip Graham, 1999; McKenna & Graham, 2000, p. 486). The scientific 
structure of Palmer’s regulatory articulations further contributes to their distance from 
popular participation.  
 
Palmer stresses his pragmatic position in relation to caucus colleagues and other politicians, 
but the overview I have provided here suggests another reading. As Harvey (2005) has 
shown, discourses of positivism and claims to an ideology free space (as technocratic 
discourse does) are central to the dissemination of market logics.  
 
 
Geoffrey Palmer; Transitive Order 
 
The transitive components of Palmer’s speech are quite predictable. The absence of human 
agency throughout his articulation of Government action can be argued to have the effect 
of “naturalising human conceptions about economy and society, while at the same time 
dehumanising the language.” (McKenna & Graham, 2000, p. 36). If we take a quote from 
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earlier for example: “There is a structural pattern in a lot of the constitutional legislation 
that I have sponsored…Constitution Act 1986, Imperial Laws Application Act, the 
National Development Act Repeal Act”. There is no evidence here of action other than “I 
have sponsored”, containing only one participant and thus no transfer of agency and no 
effect on another actor, which suggests a lack of popular participation and debate in the 
construction of government regulation 
 
By locating the Acts this way, Palmer begins the construction of a type of taxonomy, the 
naming of Acts by their technical title - “the National Development Act Repeal Act”, for 
example - removes them from the articulations of lay actors (such as ‘law’, ‘rule’ or 
‘regulation’). This kind of nominalisation is significant because the Acts themselves replace 
the complex and often significant political processes that create them. Entire terms of 
parliament, social changes, resistances, debate, and controversies are folded into self-
evident ‘things’. While maybe not Palmer’s primary intention, this has the effect of closing 
off debate, presuming a range of causal and relational processes that would be evident 
otherwise (McKenna & Graham, 2000).  
 
Palmer’s speech also contains some transitive features of interest surrounding the Treaty of 
Waitangi and Maori: “…the issue of how to deal with the Treaty of Waitangi  and issues 
relating to Maori that come from that”.  
 
The lack of agency from “Maori” is perhaps the most obvious point to highlight. The 
primary function that the omission of Maori agency fulfils can be argued to be one of 
control. The “Treaty of Waitangi” and “Maori” are represented as things to be dealt with 
and worked on rather than discussed or consulted in good faith. 
 
The lack of agency is achieved primarily through the mass reference of “Maori” as a 
homogenous entirety rather than suggesting a specific iwi or issue concerning other sub-
tribal groups. Similarly, the action of “deal with” has yet to occur, excluding any 
settlements to date and the types of negotiations which may have occurred within them.  
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I argue that the features surrounding Palmer’s treatment of the Treaty combined with his 
technocratic approach to government represent an overlap of bureaucratic action and 
ethnicity. These overlaps are significant because the way technocratic discourse is drawn on 
to make governing decisions can be observed in action. While Palmer’s aims to confront 
historic injustices are laudable, it can be argued that the proposed institutional resolution 
fails to fully attend to Maori interests. This is apparent in the way that institutional 
legislation is represented as a tool through which “social levers” (McKenna & Graham, 
2000, p. 238) might be pulled in order to “deal with” an emerging problem.  
 
This approach to historic grievances occupied an ambivalent position in the trajectory of 
neo-liberalisation in 1990. The entrenchment of the Treaty as a concern of government 
proved contradictory to the prevailing decentralisation of the state apparatus. The 
institutionalisation of ethnicity, and thus expansion and reconfiguration of the state, was 
largely irreconcilable with a market led approach to governing.  
  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
While one could hardly accuse Geoffrey Palmer of being bent on market logic, some of his 
articulations support the market prioritisations set out under David Lange. Much of the 
technocratic language that Palmer deploys take market logic as an axiom in the 
representation of de-regulation as banal regulation, appearing to offer little platform for 
resistance.  
 
By drawing on a discourse connected to positivism, the articulation of events, debates, and 
controversies as Acts of Parliament elides much of the resistance and debate generated by 
their ideological backdrop. This can be argued to constitute part of a drive towards the 
anti-ideological position which John Key openly articulated 21 years later.  
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I argue that these observations, which are not alone in their conclusions (see Fuller, 1995; 
P. Graham & Rooney, 2001), are important because the adoption of a technocratic mode 
of discourse advances the interests of market led governing. This takes on a double 
meaning in Palmer’s case. Not only did many of the regulatory frameworks that were 
enacted under Palmer’s guidance remove resources from public control (Kelsey, 1995), but 
the way he frames these manoeuvres draws on discourses of law, to which he has 
privileged access.  
 
Importantly for this project, the establishment of expert knowledge as a medium for 
governing can be tied to the ‘market ideology’ articulated by John Key through the use of 
share markets and rating agencies as a rationale for governing. However, Palmer’s 
technocratic mode should not be mistaken for a fully-fledged hegemonic discourse of 
technocracy, which “emphasises technocratic values such as the technological and expert 
knowledge and scientific management of knowledge for business and policy” (Grewal, 
2008, p. 91). As Jurgen Habermas (1992) notes, discourses alone do not rule. The 
discourses that Palmer re-articulates are dependent on the policy backdrop with which he 
was involved. Discourse is not the cause of policy change; it is policy dependent, reliant on 
existing institutional pathways to construct and “reframe cultural norms rather than only 
reify them” (Grewal, 2008, p. 92).  
 
 
2.3  Mike Moore; Parliamentary Statement, 1990 
 
Mike Moore was Prime Minister for seven weeks and Labour party leader for three years. 
An increasingly vocal group of female Members of Parliament, Ministers, and party 
officials influenced his political work. Moore was the first Prime Minister in waiting to 
sustain a serious leadership challenge from a female colleague (Helen Clark). During the 
leadership challenge, Moore implied he was under attack from the “lesbian left”, while his 
supporters labelled the challenge “Mike vs. the Dyke” (Mitchell, 1996, p. 49). Ultimately, 
Moore’s somewhat erratic approach to leadership combined with the political landscape 
generated by the following National Government, paved the way for Helen Clark as leader 
of the opposition and then Prime Minister in 1999 (Hayward, 2004).  
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Moore’s speech is based around his successful challenge to the post of Prime Minister. He 
begins by briefly paying tribute to Palmer’s time in parliament. He then outlines the 
political backdrop he is working from before attempting to juxtapose Labour’s and 
National’s policies, citing the “traditional” targets of Labour policy as the poor, the sick, 
and “our country”, somewhat at odds with the monetary policies and actions deployed 
under Lange and Palmer.  
 
 
Mike Moore; Discursive Order 
 
The structural adjustments which took place between the Muldoon Government and 1990 
when Moore took office were profound, informing the discursive articulations of each 
leader hence forth. Moore is no exception, his attempt to contrast the policies of the 
Opposition with those of Labour are marked by many of the contradictions commonly 
cited within projects of neo-liberalisation: the disparity between equality of opportunity and 
equality of outcome or the monopoly of power vis-á-vis market failures, for example 
(Harvey, 2005).  
 
Moore’s history of health problems also contributes to the structure of his speech. His use 
of “battler” could be thought of as a term to make sense of his own health problems, 
something that gave Moore the ‘common touch’ in his political work with vulnerable 
people (Hayward, 2004). However, the discursive order from which the “battler” is drawn 
can also be argued to reflect a much longer history of culturally constructed attitudes 
towards life in New Zealand; “I have been a battler, and I know that this country is full of 
battlers who want to fight for it. I relish the opportunity to do so”. 
 
This could be argued to describe the idealised citizen, a self-sufficient, provincial, and 
hardworking ‘everyday New Zealander’. This can be linked to a colonial history of settlers 
overcoming adversity, not only through a struggle to found communities in difficult 
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topographical conditions, but also through the incorporation of Maori into the settler 
colonial project, and the struggle to establish Pakeha norms.  
 
This interpretation of the “battler” can be supported on a number of levels by some of the 
literature surrounding colonial settler societies. The Hegelian master-slave dialectic 
deployed by  Bell (2004) points to the way that recognition over the ‘other’, constituted 
through language, is realised by an on-going and structurally unequal struggle (not 
dissimilar to the establishment of a hegemony). This leads to a “distorted conversation” 
(Bell, 2004, p. 163) between the two struggling parties (Maori and Pakeha) and has the 
effect of masking the violent relationship between ‘lordship and bondage’. In New 
Zealand, this is characterised by a disavowal of colonial violence against both land and 
indigenous people, where violence is cast in romantic ways, emphasising a heroic and 
resourceful struggle over a domineering one. This is not to suggest that Moore’s “battler” 
has racist or colonial intentions folded within it, but that it can refer to a purportedly 
‘authentic’ approach to life in New Zealand. I will explore this more in the following 
section. Suffice to say the “battler” can be argued to support self-sufficiency, competition, 
and the establishment of ‘equal opportunity’, each of which can reflect different neo-
liberalising discourses. 
 
Moore also makes a direct appeal to the historical changes his party has witnessed, 
emphasising his intent to hold fast to Labour’s roots: 
 
A Government that will ensure that all the people share the gains from the pains of 
the past few years; a Government that reflects the New Zealand and Labour Party 
values of fairness, equality, tolerance, and respect. 
 
Aside from the dualism of pain verses gain (analysed later), Moore is authored by his 
party’s history. The discursive resources of the Labour party, organised around “fairness, 
equality, tolerance and respect”, must be reproduced in order for Moore’s position to be 
rendered coherent against the backdrop of two terms of rigorous market led reform and 
social change. The party had already lost two Prime Ministers and a Finance Minister 
through the marketization of the state apparatus. The articulation of “fairness, equality, 
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tolerance, and respect”, while contradictory to the market led project, can be argued to 
hedge against the monetarist extremity deployed by Moore’s colleagues.  
 
Moore is thus positioned at a point in history where the profound impacts of opening up 
New Zealand’s markets to overseas trade and investment could not easily be undone. 
Terms like “economic closet”, “share the gains from the pains” and “opportunity” are 
salient. However, Moore’s working class background as an active trade unionist contradicts 
his arguably pro-market articulations. This might partly reflect his fairly erratic style of 
leadership, but also points to the more contradictory and spontaneous ways in which neo-
liberalisation emerges at certain conjunctures (Larner, 2009).  
 
Moore’s speech functions as something of a placeholder for the unstable nature of neo-
liberalisation under the Fourth Labour Government. There is little evidence of reference to 
other texts beyond Moore’s articulation of party history and only some interdiscursivity, as 
in the “battler”. It does however represent a significant moment in the trajectory of neo-
liberalisation.  The very fact that Moore took office at all suggests that the tensions of the 
reformist Lange Government were keenly felt. This conjuncture of neo-liberalisation can 
be argued to represent an attempt to grapple with the broadly destructive (Peck & Tickell, 
2002) period of reform leading to Moore’s short lived time as Prime minister.  
 
 
Mike Moore; Discursive Practice 
 
The key discursive element of the “battler” identified earlier, suggests a number of 
interesting meanings and interpretations. The “battler” is sometimes deployed in the name 
of moral appeals to voters, as a tool to gain the support of a constituency, which fits 
Moore’s use rather well: Politicians…are very fond of talking, usually with a catch in their 
throats, about ‘hard-working Kiwis’, ‘Kiwi battlers’ or the nauseating cliche ‘Kiwis of 
Main/Struggle Street’ (Bunting, 2011, p. 4). 
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Further, a cursory glance at news print archives reveals that the “battler” is commonly 
deployed in journalistic practice in relation to illness, particularly concerning young people 
who are affected by cancer, whether or not they make a recovery. It has been taken to refer 
to an ‘ordinary’ person “who has few natural advantages, but works doggedly and with little 
reward, struggles hard for livelihood, and displays enormous courage in doing so” (Sekiya, 
2008, p. 22). 
 
While this is almost certainly within the purview of Moore’s use of the term, engendering 
friendliness and solidarity, it can also carry a more historically pertinent reading. In New 
Zealand the “battler” can be entangled with ethnic relations, as van Beynen’s (2005, p. 11) 
later articulation shows; “[Don] Brash, like the clever dentist he could have been, excavated 
the cavity harbouring Kiwi battler discomfort about apparent preferential treatment for 
Maori”. 
 
The “battler” in this context is part of a national narrative constructed by settler 
colonialism. This is supported by Bell’s (2004) identification of an essentialist view of 
settler life in New Zealand through the lens of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, noted earlier. 
The “battler” constitutes part of the settler condition, romantically suggesting that all is fair 
in the struggle for nation building and reconciliation between people and land. This can be 
constructed as a reduction in difference between the settler and ethnic others through 
“epistemological violence” (Bell, 2004, p. 253), we are all “battlers” as Moore suggests.   
 
Veracini’s (2010) contention that the settler narrative is by nature ‘linear’, supports this 
view. Most colonial narratives are tied to a state of origin in which return is possible; the 
colonial subject embarks on a journey eventually to return home. Colonial settlers of New 
Zealand had no such option. Settler narratives are thus organised according to on-going 
processes of establishment or “battling”: 
 
Displacement in the wilderness, a frontier phase made up in succession by entrance 
into a district, battling the land, community building, and, eventually by the ‘closing 
in’ of the frontier (Veracini, 2010, p. 99) 
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Similarly, throughout the 1980s, as mass transport became more accessible and barriers to 
international trade and migration were lifted as part of the structural adjustment process, 
people immigrated to New Zealand, leading diasporic lives in increasing numbers. The 
diasporic condition in itself can constitute a battle, for recognition, for resources, and for 
citizenship. More recent immigrants do not get the same chance to set up an “exemplary 
model of social organisation” (Veracini, 2010, p. 4) as those of settler colonialism. I refer 
here to the relatively recent increase in migration from many Asian states. This has been 
popularly received as both an enhancement to New Zealand’s economic fortunes and as a 
drag on the labour market and public services, not to mention in terms of a number of 
pejorative discourses surrounding cultural norms of the ‘immigrant other’.  
 
The “battler” as a discursive resource thus has a number of appeals folded within its 
meaning. While Moore’s articulation asserts each of these (self-sufficiency, independence 
and the establishment of social norms) to a degree, it would be premature to regard his 
“battler” as essentialising epistemological violence. However, the “battler” arguably 
rebounds in favour of the market logics deployed by the following fourth National 
Government in the name of self-sufficiency where the family or community rather than the 
state are supposed to provide the security and rights previously associated with citizenship.  
 
Another example of Moore’s discursive action can be noted in his naturalisations of market 
logic. In this 1990 speech Moore takes the majority of the socio-political conditions in 
which he is situated for granted: “A Government that will ensure that all the people  share 
the gains from the pains of the past few years” 
 
Boers (1997, p. 232) argues that ‘pain versus gain’ forms part of a discourse based on 
“health, fitness and racing” which naturalises free market logic. Terms such as ‘financial 
injection’ and ‘economic revival’ (among many others) are commonly deployed to frame 
the action of markets. These types of metaphor can be argued to support market 
imperatives through an asserted need to be fit and healthy in order to pursue market shifts.  
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The assumption that economic gain requires pain is debatable, and forecloses a number of 
alternative approaches economic development by representing market forces as natural and 
inexorable. The fact remains that the pain of reform, necessary or otherwise, was spread 
unevenly across the New Zealand population, and would continue to be so through the 
1990s under the leadership of Jim Bolger and Jenny Shipley. 
 
 
Transitive Order; Mike Moore 
 
I have already touched on the way “share the gains from the pains of the past few years” 
appears to naturalise the free market logics of the fourth Labour Government. A closer 
inspection of the transitive components surrounding this articulation reveals the somewhat 
contradictory manner in which Moore embedded himself in the order of discourse of the 
time.  
 
For example, the use of “battlers” points to the volitional action of people in the market 
place: “This country is full of battlers who want to fight for it”. 
 
However, despite the apparently potent agency of battling, there are neither objects which 
can be battled against nor any specific participants, precluding human impact on market 
forces. The action of “battlers” is thus semiotic rather than material. If the action were 
material it would feature both an object of action and an outcome - “battlers who fight for 
their jobs and livelihoods” -  for example. This is significant because it distinguishes 
between an action that will have an effect of the world and one which will not, prioritising 
market forces over human agency. Further, the way “battlers” replaces specific people as 
actors further reduces human agency. This conveys meaning that cannot reach beyond the 
context of the speech, lending “battlers” a degree of discursive flexibility to be deployed in 
other contexts.  
 
The term “battlers” in its grammatical network can be constructed as an abstraction of real 
life, supporting the romantic interpretation of self-sufficiency outlined earlier. The effect of 
generalizing a group of people through the reference of “battlers” has the effect of not 
only hiding the nature of the people who do the battling, but also the actions that make up 
the battling itself. None of these readings of Moore’s articulation locate actors in a position 
of power in relation to market forces, showing the effect that abstractions can have on 
representing reality. 
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Discussion and Summary 
 
Mike Moore’s position within the discursive trajectory of neo-liberalisation in New Zealand 
is somewhat difficult to pinpoint. His history within Labour’s networks of trade unionism 
supports his assertion of returning to Labour’s roots of “fairness, equality, tolerance, and 
respect”. These seem somewhat incongruous with the positioning of opportunity over 
equality, the professed necessity of pain as a component of economic gain and the 
abstraction of the “battler”. Moore’s somewhat contradictory logics can show that 
“neoliberal discourses and techniques do not always emerge in the sites we assume, travel 
in the forms we expect, or move in the directions we anticipate.” (Larner, 2009, p. 1577) 
 
Moore later stated that “there is no contradiction between a lifelong adherence to the 
principles of internationalism and worker solidarity, and believing in the worldwide benefits 
of the free flow of trade and ideas” (Moore, 2003, in Larner, 2009, p. 1583). While this is 
reflected to a degree in the transitive and discursive features of Moore’s speech, it would be 
simplistic to suggest that Moore has his ideological bents mixed up. Moore’s emphasis on 
fairness and equality can be related to what he sees as ‘good governance’, as a desirable aim 
of organising free trade.  
 
In sum, Moore’s speech is constructed around his rise to Prime Minister, which he held for 
just seven weeks in the lead up to the 1990 election. Though he embeds himself in the 
traditional aspects of the Labour party’s history of social democracy, his representation of 
economic gain requiring an element of pain, his framing of opportunity, and his use of the 
“battler” as an idealised citizen, are somewhat at odds with each other. Moore’s represents 
market forces as inevitable and - somewhat contradictorily - as compatible with some aims 
of social justice.  
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2.4  Conclusion: Fourth Labour Government; 1984-1990 
 
 
The speeches of each of the fourth Labour Government’s leaders reflect in one way or 
another the contradictions and specificities of neo-liberalisation in New Zealand.  
 
In Lange’s speech emergent market logic appears in the representation of neo-liberalisation 
as inevitable and the articulation of “management” as a driver of reform. I linked this to 
the relatively recent uptake of market led structural reform, revealing traces of Robert 
Muldoon’s embedded liberalism. The ‘no alternative’ position which Lange articulated 
revealed a degree of slippage between the description of affairs and the policy prescriptions 
which address them. This has the effect of eliding controversies, resistances, and 
contradictions in the formulation of structural adjustment. This was particularly apparent 
through an examination of the way that Lange constructed the labour market.  
 
In the case of Geoffrey Palmer, contradiction is found between his articulation of a 
technocratic discourse surrounding economic affairs and the suggestion of institutionalising 
the Treaty of Waitangi. The representation of market led reform as a self-evident ‘thing’ 
through technocratic discourse hid a number of ideological assumptions and events which 
excludes reform from popular participation. This contributed to an overall approach to 
market led rule which sat uncomfortably with the institutionalisation of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. This proved irreconcilable (contributing to Palmer’s ousting from leadership), 
indicating the unstable position of market led governing.  
 
The specificities of Moore’s speech, which were noted predominantly in the “battler”, are 
supported by some of the literature surrounding the contemporary conditions of colonial 
settler societies. It was argued that the “battler” forms part of a romantic interpretation of 
self-sufficiency, arguably reflecting a history of disavowed violence in the settler colonial 
condition. Moore also deployed a discourse based on health and illness, suggesting that the 
“pain” of reform is a necessary part of the subsequent economic “gain”.  
 
These seem like a somewhat disparate group of conclusions to reach for a Government 
that appeared so driven by economic determinism. To be sure, these conclusions are but 
one reading of many. The moments of neo-liberalisation outlined in this chapter indicate 
but a few possible conjunctures of the Labour party’s rule. Their significance is that they 
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indicate the tenuousness of treating neo-liberalisation as a monolithic narrative; it is not 
without struggle, resistance, and contradiction.  
 
The “battler”, for example, can expose the role that settler narratives play in the 
establishment of market logics, rebounding in favour of the self-sufficiency and self-
government pursued by the fourth National Government. Similarly, the institutionalisation 
of the Treaty of Waitangi by Palmer proved irreconcilable with the structural adjustment of 
the 1980s. However, it would be taken up in ways congruent with market logics through an 
exploitation of rangatiratanga (self-determination) by Helen Clark nine years later as part of 
an aim to “close the gaps” between Maori and Pakeha, promoting self-sufficiency and 
community over state intervention.  
 
Further tentative links could be drawn between Lange’s somewhat incomplete articulation 
of the inevitability of market forces and the more complete articulations of John Key, 
responding to the 2008 financial crisis, which appear to stabilise the ‘everdayness’ of 
markets by offering solutions to recession organised around a ‘market ideology’. Palmer’s 
technocratic discourse also bears some consistencies with Key’s inclusion of credit rating 
agencies in his 2011 speech, when he positions the expert knowledge of non-state actors 
beyond democratic debate. Whichever reading one gives to the features outlined in this 
chapter, the contradictory and unstable nature of neo-liberalisation under the fourth 
Labour Government is quite clear.  
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3.  The Fourth National Government, 1990-1999: 
 Communitarianism and the Moral Code of Responsibility 
 
The fourth National Government came to power off the back of the Labour 
Government’s largely dysfunctional caucus which had succumbed to the fallout of its 
radical financial reforms. Jim Bolger, National party leader and a farmer from Taranaki, 
held the seat of Prime Minister for seven years. He governed for a little over two terms, 
before being deposed by New Zealand’s first female Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley.  
 
The reforms set in motion by the fourth Labour Government were repudiated in the lead 
up to the 1990 election, as Bolger’s speech shows. However, Minister of Finance Ruth 
Richardson continued the monetarist agenda. The biggest changes occurred in the 
provision of welfare and the labour market. Inflation adjustments for benefits were 
withdrawn; the age for youth wages was increased by 5 years to 25; and the ‘stand down’ 
period for those considered to be unemployed ‘voluntarily’ was increased from six weeks to 
six months (Kelsey, 1995). In 1991, the Employment Contracts Act came into effect, 
allowing individuals and non-union groups to negotiate with employers. These adjustments 
(among many others) fell disproportionately on women, the young, the working poor, and 
the long term unemployed (O'Brien & Wilkes, 1993).  
 
As with the reforms of the fourth Labour Government, there was a concentration of 
power between the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and the Treasury. Treasury 
briefing papers again provided a criticism of Government action, suggesting that state 
intervention through social welfare worked against the poor by generating a lack of 
incentives to achieve “dignity security and participation in society” (Kelsey, 1995, p. 229). 
These themes mirrored many of those deployed by Bolger and Shipley.  However, there are 
also some contradictions to this moral authoritarianism. Bolger’s articulation of 
communitarian values, for example, takes the community as a point of departure for the 
utopian creation of a “decent society”. This connotes a cooperative population 
characterised by solidarity and marks something of a reaction against the extremity of 
Labour’s reform. This represents a contrast with Shipley’s articulation of competition and 
the ‘responsibilisation’ of families through the Code of Social and Family Responsibility 
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(Department of Social Welfare, 1998). While not covered in either of these speeches, the 
‘Code’ represents a key moment in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand, arguably paving 
the way for the ‘Third Way’ approach to governing deployed by Helen Clark.  
 
 
3.1  Jim Bolger; General Debate, 1990 
 
Bolger’s 1990 speech provides a basic outline of the National Party’s concerns for the 
following year and the 1990 election. Bolger would win office by repudiating the now 
dysfunctional fourth Labour Government and the anxiety generated by the financial 
‘revolution’ (Johansson, 2004). Bolger’s campaign narrative was organised around a 
promise to restore the “decent society”, with paid work and community relations providing 
the foundations.  
 
The “decent society” (deployed 18 times in this speech) reflects the Bolger Government’s 
commitment to a number of contradictory political strategies. During the first term this 
was to the spread of market logic driven by Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson, who 
moved monetary reform into areas untouched by the market for several decades like the 
conditions of labour and health services. A near loss in the 1993 election revealed a 
significant public backlash over Richardson’s reforms. She lost the finance portfolio and 
Bolger continued his more moderate communitarian approach to government.  
 
Communitarianism constitutes subjects through the community, to which they owe a “debt 
of respect and consideration”; there are no “unencumbered selves” (Heywood, 1998, p. 
148). Bolger’s communitarianism can be read as a concern that the relatively extreme 
reforms carried out under the fourth Labour Government had not “fostered a family 
friendly environment” (Davey, 2000, p. 126). Bolger thus advocated breaking the cycle of 
“dependency” on the state which he claims is characteristic of a lack of social cohesiveness. 
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Jim Bolger; Discursive Order 
 
The discursive order of politics in late 1989 and 1990 New Zealand was framed by the last 
ten years of reform and social change. The discursive limits of these changes are revealed 
through Bolger’s strong reference to global economic indicators and measures of success: 
“The Minister of Overseas Trade and Marketing could not identify a single company 
among the 30 major companies interviewed that had positive plans to invest in New 
Zealand”. The way out of economic strife is recognised through global business 
engagement, rather than the regional development suggested by Lange. Similarly, Bolger’s 
positioning of New Zealand within a trading block constituted by Asia and the Pacific as a 
strategy for economic growth was particularly controversial, but this would become 
increasingly stabilised as reform progressed.  
 
Bolger also articulates some points surrounding the functions of the “decent society”:  
 
To achieve a decent society it is essential to have a growing and prosperous 
economy so that people can participate; so that they have the opportunity to use 
their individual talents in a job…so that they know that when they start a family 
they will be able to provide for that family, that when they are sick the hospitals will 
be there…Those are the components of a decent society. 
 
While Lange also frames “opportunity” over equality as a key aspect of improving life in 
New Zealand, Bolger dictates this in quite specific terms. Bolger’s appeals to “family” and 
entrepreneurial ideals of “opportunity” can be read not only as reflecting his own 
communitarian values but also the values of the National party’s genesis, centred on 
farming and agriculture in provincial New Zealand (Gustafson, 1986).  
 
Later in the speech, a reaction to the failures of the Lange Government is marked by 
Bolger as a pragmatic one, which provides part of the basis for the construction of social 
capital as a logic for governing that is increasingly apparent under Jenny Shipley and Helen 
Clark. Social capital in this context refers to the economic benefits gained from 
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cooperation between individuals. This is realised by Bolger through the communitarian 
construction of individual duty to the community: 
 
New Zealanders, in a calm, pragmatic, but completely and eminently sensible 
response, said that they should, when possible, do something worthwhile, not just 
be paid to stay at home to do nothing 
 
This is significant because it can be argued to perpetuate the decentralisation of the welfare 
state, though perhaps not in ways which Bolger predicted. The kinship based discourses 
deployed by Bolger framed the roll-back of state welfare services, such as the reduction of 
the unemployment benefit by $14 a week and the decrease (of between 9 and 16 per cent) 
of the widows and domestic purposes benefit “as an ‘incentive’ to become self-supporting” 
(Kelsey, 1995, p. 243). However Bolger’s communitarianism also suggested a number of 
universal rights, such as state funded tertiary education and a strong justice system, which 
sit somewhat ambiguously with a push to shrink state spending and intervention. Neither 
the resources nor recognition to support these goals were forthcoming (Bolger, 1998).  
 
Bolger’s order of discourse can be argued to supplant the problems associated with 
Labour’s monetarist economics with a morally constructed discourse organised around the 
nodal point of the “decent society”. A number of issues coalesce around this, such as the 
references to unemployment, healthcare, and education, noted above. Minister of Finance 
Ruth Richardson’s policy prescriptions generated ideological contradictions early on in 
Bolger’s first term, limiting his communitarian position and eventually prompting her 
dismissal after National’s poor performance in the 1993 election.  
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Jim Bolger; Discursive Practice  
 
The most obvious discursive form in this speech is the “decent society”, noted earlier. In 
the context of this speech it appears as a utopian signification - a cooperative community 
supported by a range of basic but universal rights and ties of kinship in place of intrusive 
state intervention. It also brings to mind a radical centrist democracy, with high degrees of 
political engagement, social cohesion, self-sufficiency, and community networks which 
promote economic stability. 
 
The backdrop of the “decent society” was marked by a somewhat incongruous set of 
policy moves. Ruth Richardson’s strong hold on cabinet ensured that the market led 
economic reforms begun under Lange would be carried into labour, health, and welfare 
policy. Trade unions were effectively written out of the law by the introduction of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, ending compulsory unionism and tipping bargaining 
power in favour of employers. Health care moved closer to a user pays system through the 
establishment of a purchaser-provider split, forcing primary health organisations to 
compete for money from bulk funded regional health authorities. Welfare entitlements 
were tightened and the universal family benefit was abolished, removing the sole 
independent family income for many women (Kelsey, 1995).  
 
Thus “the opportunity to be involved” in the “decent society” is realised in relatively harsh 
terms, forcing citizens from state social security into community or individual support 
mechanisms. The framing of opportunity in place of equality represents a common thread 
throughout projects of neo-liberalisation, particularly under the Labour party’s Third Way 
from 1999. Bolger’s articulation of “opportunity” is perhaps the most salient of this project 
as the first to take social policy as grounds for the dissemination of market logic. The 
“decent society” as a discursive resource can thus be construed as a segue towards a 
creative moment in a broadly destructive period of structural reform, compelling certain 
types of behaviour and partially creating frameworks for popular engagement in the 
market.  
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One possible source for the relatively flexible content of the “decent society” (including, 
but not limited to education, unemployment, family relations, criminal and social justice, 
and health services) can be traced to a number of links to conservative parties 
internationally. The National party of the mid 1980s was engaged with an “international 
alliance of anti-socialist political parties” (Gustafson, 1986). Party representatives and 
organisers met on a regular basis with the goal of sharing “policies, techniques, strategies 
and organisational structures” (Kelsey, 1995, p. 39). Thus, the “decent society” highlights a 
discursive strategy arguably marked by a degree of intertextuality, indicating social change 
(Fairclough, 1992).  
 
As a political strategy the “decent society” not only worked in favour Bolger’s policy 
backdrop of state spending cuts, but also against him it its repudiation of Labour’s market 
led policies. It arguably acted for and against market logic simultaneously. For many, the 
“decent society” signalled not a greater emphasis on equitable and harmonious social 
organisation but a contradictory “overwhelming focus on price stability” and the 
“questionable wisdom in pursuing the goal of fiscal balance in the midst of a serious 
recession” (Boston & Dalziel, 1992b, p. ix). This contradictory and abstract interpretation 
of the “decent society” reveals a significant moment in the neo-liberalisation of New 
Zealand. Bolger marks a possible starting point for a ‘post fourth Labour Government 
neo-liberalisation’, perpetuating a deeper and more socially pervasive current of structural 
and social adjustment. Bolger’s communitarianism shows a somewhat creative reaction 
against the extremity of the fourth Labour Government’s reform while arguably supporting 
its outcomes.  
 
 
Jim Bolger; Transitive Order  
 
Bolger’s repertoire for interpreting political themes in favour of market techniques spreads 
beyond the articulation of a “decent society”. A number of grammatical features reveal the 
prioritisation of the fiscal bottom line and market forces in favour of other policy 
approaches to meeting the needs of society. While this is limited in its conclusions of 
Bolger’s overall ideological position, it can be argued to reflect the discursive conditions in 
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the late 1980s and early 1990s, oriented around the widespread dissemination of market 
logics as a way of organising the welfare state. 
 
Bolger’s speech contains a strong emphasis on the moral aspects of government, apparent 
in his articulations of family values (noted earlier) and a strong police force: “A decent 
society must be built upon people knowing that the police and those in authority will 
protect them from muggers, thieves, and rapists”. 
 
These articulations can be recognised as a repudiation of the fourth Labour Government’s 
failure to attend to diverse public opinions, rather than a coherent ideologically driven 
imperative in themselves (Boston & Dalziel, 1992a). This can be seen in the contradictory 
ways that Bolger represents public reactions to the previous Government’s unemployment 
policies, actions of the fourth Labour Government itself, and public reactions to market 
forces:  
 
New Zealanders, in a calm, pragmatic, but completely and eminently sensible 
response, said that they should, when possible, do something worth while….that is 
a total endorsement of one key plank of the National Party's decent society. 
 
In this quote “New Zealanders” not only represent an outwardly visible existence as a 
group, but also have the active emotional capacity to make informed decisions. The 
attribution of reactions like these is not spread evenly across actors through the speech. 
Bolger dwells on the rational reactions of the population and those of the National party, 
contrasting them with the incongruent actions of the opposition who “handcuff the 
police”. This reveals a prioritisation of the moral dimension of Bolger’s “decent society” 
over the economic reforms of the Labour Government, which are simply represented as 
having a series of unintended consequences.  
 
In a similar vein, the reactions of New Zealanders in the quote above are represented 
dynamically, as movements in thought based on real world events. By contrast, the actions 
associated with the economy later in the speech are objectivated through a series of 
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nominalisations, positioning the economy as an object devoid of human agency and thus 
beyond regulation. This most obviously noted in Bolger’s phrase: “The economy is not 
recovering”. 
 
While this approach to representing the economy is a contrast with the statements around 
“New Zealanders” above, it is consistent with representations of action in scientific 
reporting, naturalising the inexorable nature of the economy. In scientific reports, natural 
processes of growth and change (or a lack thereof) are represented metonymically rather 
than by the agency of those manipulating a variable. The same is true of the economy in 
the example above. The agency of those responsible for economic recovery is elided 
behind “not recovering” as a self-evident process.  Had this been recast as a matter of 
agency, as in “this Government has managed the economy incorrectly”, then the outcome 
is slightly different and thus a concern of policy formulation rather than a matter of 
involuntary action.  
 
The distinction between rational reactions to social policy and automated agent-less 
responses to economic issues supports the contradictions of Bolger’s communitarianism 
outlined earlier. Actors are positioned simultaneously as powerful and powerless, 
positioning social security as a matter for popular participation and the economy as an 
inexorable force. These representations can be read as a microcosm of Bolger’s wider 
approach to rule, characterised by a simultaneous reaction against the previous 
Government’s reform while allowing similar changes to occur within the welfare state.  
 
 
Discussion and Summary 
 
Bolger’s 1990 speech is organised around the narrative of creating the “decent society”, the 
National party campaign slogan for the 1990 election. While it is difficult to disagree with 
such a proposition, this analysis has noted that the “decent society” is a signifier with little a 
priori meaning or stabilized content and is thus open to manipulation in a number of ways. 
The corresponding National party policy release for the 1990s oscillates between the 
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“decent society” and the “enterprise society”, which might have given an indication of 
what was to come (National Party of New Zealand, 1990, p. 21). The “decent society” 
projected an image of community characterised by a high level of cohesiveness and thus 
little need for state intervention beyond a basic set of rights such as healthcare, education, 
and a strong justice system.  
 
The content of this speech broadly reflects the initially indicated policy backdrop of 
Bolger’s fourth National Government. I argue that the policy outcomes looked quite 
different to most indications of a “decent society”, as demand for welfare services 
increased, the “welfare that works” (National Party of New Zealand, 1990, p. 10) was not 
working at all. Incentivising beneficiaries into work by removing benefits simply resulted in 
more poverty (Davey, 2000). This unpopular move was at least partly achieved through the 
concentration of power between the Minister of Finance, Prime Minister, and the Treasury, 
as well as by discursive framing  
 
I noted at the beginning of this section that Bolger develops the concept of “opportunity” 
over equality as a “key plank” for policy development, framing human behaviour as 
entrepreneurial. This contributes to dismantling of citizenship rights, which had already 
come under strain through the economic reforms of the fourth Labour Government. 
Entrepreneurialism overlaps with Bolger’s communitarian turn, suggesting that work and 
businesses constitute vital inputs into cohesive communities through financial and social 
capital. The focus on “opportunity” can be argued to support a type of methodological 
individualism, where the basic unit of policy reference is an individual person embedded in 
a network of social relations constituting a community. This was revealed most obviously 
in the Employment Contracts Act 1991, which would “give New Zealanders the chance to 
negotiate their own hours and pay” (National Party of New Zealand, 1990, p. 5).  
 
The second key discursive articulation of the “decent society” pointed to a tension between 
a conservative and market led approach to rule, noted particularly in Bolger’s simultaneous 
repudiation and support of market logic. However, an increased Government focus on 
families and the resulting switch from a joint income couple to the “core family” as a unit 
of assessment for state support is not completely contradictory to the tightening of welfare 
targets (Boston, 1992). Of the four possible permutations of the core family an unattached 
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adult without children was one, allowing the tightening of welfare rights on the grounds of 
family relations (a family can consist of just one person) and cutting payments to 
individuals on the basis of perceived need (families are suggested to need more). 
 
Bolger and his cabinet minister’s attempts at deepening the reforms set in motion by the 
fourth Labour Government thus tipped the ‘moral balance sheet’ (Muller, 1993) of society 
in favour of a more destructive mode of neo-liberalisation, dismantling key aspects of the 
welfare state. The transitive order that I outlined earlier supports this through a moral 
application of agency to actors in some situations while simultaneously eliding agency 
behind natural events in others. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2005, p. xi) note, this can be 
seen as part of a condition where “a universal 'domination', presented as an iron law, is 
exercised, while at the same time seeking to advance the work of individual liberation, 
conceived as an emancipation from external powers and intervention”. In this way it is 
possible to view Bolger’s ideological position as more coherent than might first be noted, 
market logics need not preclude all communitarian values. The moral positioning of “New 
Zealanders” and an emphasis on families partly supports a move to roll-back welfare 
services. 
 
Bolger’s discourses of rule are thus messy and sometimes contradictory, which leads to a 
question over the stability of his ideological position. Boltanski and Chiapello (2005, p. 103) 
suggest that due to the gradual but relentless restructuring of capitalism since the 1960s, by 
1990 there was a need to generate “some new general representation of the economic 
world”. The narrative of the “decent society” and all that it entails thus fulfils part of a 
utopian vision of community cooperation against a backdrop of widespread discontent, 
deploying a set of rules and codes (such as the lack of agency in the economy for example) 
which could then guide further action. This action would come in the form of Bolger’s 
removal from office and Jenny Shipley’s somewhat timely adaptation and crystallisation of 
Bolger’s “decent society” in the Code of Social and Family Responsibility (Department of 
Social Welfare, 1998).  
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3.2  Jenny Shipley: The Way Ahead, 1997 
 
Shipley’s leadership of the National party and as Prime Minister emerged from the tensions 
generated by MMP and the resulting balance of power held by Winston Peters after the 
1996 election. Bolger’s position as Prime Minister was also challenged by the tensions in his 
cabinet as Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson deployed a set of harsh policy reforms 
which rolled-back core parts of the welfare state. When Bolger’s position failed, Shipley 
emerged as New Zealand’s first female Prime Minister, and to date the only female leader 
of the National party.  
 
Shipley’s social policies broadly revolved around a push to make people “responsible for 
themselves and their families in a low tax environment, rather than depending on the state 
for healthcare and welfare needs” (Hayward, 2004, p. 262). This was marked by the 
recasting of the unemployment benefit as a ‘community wage’ in 1998, where beneficiaries 
were to work in return for state support or face benefit withdrawal. Other categories of 
support, including the invalids, sickness, and domestic purposes benefits were also 
subsumed under the ‘community wage’. Support for the predominantly market led policy 
environment was underpinned by relatively conservative interpretations of family and 
individual relations, with an increasingly apparent emphasis on including people in 
employment markets through state intervention in the development of social capital.  
 
To this end, an analysis of Shipley’s speech broadly reflects the policy backdrop of her 
Government: the development and entrenchment of a flexibility ethos that lay behind the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the reform of education denoted by the adage of 
‘backing winners’, particularly in the tertiary sector where the commercialization of 
knowledge was seen as playing a key role in economic growth. The concept of ‘social 
capital’ was increasingly apparent as an operational basis for welfare provision backed by 
the “‘responsibilisation’ of individuals and families, and the continuation of a user-pays 
philosophy alongside targeting strategies” (Peters & Fitzsimons, 1999, p. 32). This was 
crystallised in the Code of Social and Family Responsibility (CSFR). The CSFR was in part 
a discussion document that aimed to clarify the relationship between the state and citizens 
in relation to social welfare and the governing of families. Over one million discussion 
booklets on which the paper would be based were distributed, prompting 94,303 responses 
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(Davey, 2000). The CSFR is a significant document which reflected yet another radical 
move in New Zealand politics: “the idea of having a code…to define what can be expected 
of people in relation to what Government does through its social policies” (Davey, 2000, p. 
vii). However, this would reveal a number of tensions between conservative imperatives to 
intervene in family life and a continual push to shrink the state apparatus.  
 
 
Jenny Shipley; Discursive Order 
 
Shipley’s speech covers the basic policy framework that the National Party would pursue 
under her leadership for the three years. These generally continue the trends of the last two 
terms, focusing strongly on the construction of a ‘consensus’ on economic development:  
 
So the arguments of left and right in terms of economic policy are much less 
relevant than they were in yesteryear….Most countries know that productivity 
means that you stay competitive with those whom you are selling against. 
  
Following the trajectory of 13 years of economic reform, Shipley is partly authored by what 
she sees as a consensus in market led governing. This can be read as reflecting a growing 
trend of market logics being treated as common sense. The claim that politics in economic 
policy is now “much less relevant” represents a cautious articulation compared to those by 
Helen Clark in 2002 (that neo-liberalism is over) and John Key in 2011 (that he does not 
follow ideology). The attempt to distance ideology from government can also be factored 
into the emergence of the Third Way, a profession to go beyond left and right political 
divides (examined in the following chapter) (Giddens, 1998). 
 
Shipley also reinvents Bolger’s communitarianism in more specific terms of ‘social capital’, 
emphasising the benefits that result from social cohesion and cooperation: 
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Currently there is no consensus around the issues of responsibilities and obligations 
that lie between Government, communities, families and individuals. To do well 
New Zealanders need to look after themselves and each other. 
 
The central tenets of this statement are later reflected and crystallised in the CSFR which 
attempted to formalise the obligations that Shipley asserts above. The code was developed 
off the back of Bolger’s communitarianism, which had by this point proven inconsistent 
with the largely anti-social reforms of the previous seven years, though Shipley’s attempt at 
reconciliation was eventually proven just as unstable.   
 
Shipley’s position as New Zealand’s first female prime minister is also significant. While no 
explicit passages in this speech reveal gender politics, Shipley reflected libertarian values on 
abortion and gay rights, yet supported universal health care and free tertiary education 
(Hayward, 2004). This speech, however, reflects traditional moral values to a stronger 
degree than Bolger’s, something that did not go unnoticed by her supporters: “We must 
consider further our obligations: as parents to our children as children to their families as 
individuals to our communities and as Government to New Zealanders”. Indeed, one 
could argue that many of her wider policy aims for welfare provision on the grounds of 
competitive advantage obstructed or hindered the position of women, noted in her 
involvement with Bill Birch in the removal of the Employment Equity Act in 1990 and 
cuts in early childhood education funding (Hayward, 2004).  
 
In this speech, Shipley moves away from the order of discourse articulated by Bolger 
around communities, and builds on more mobile and expansive discourses of social capital. 
This is constituted by a stronger emphasis on the nodal points of family and individual as 
signifiers for the politics of welfare. For example, the passage below openly reveals a 
commitment to competition as a basis for social organisation: 
 
New Zealanders like winning. We all want to succeed as people, as families, as 
communities and as a nation. We all want to have the opportunity, through 
freedom and choice, to be able to lead satisfying and fulfilled lives. 
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Shipley’s utterances around competition and the welfare state are of course limited and 
framed by MMP which had generated a new structure in the cabinet and Government. This 
was organised to complete the ‘unfinished business’ of welfare reform set in motion early 
in Bolger’s term. However, Shipley’s coalition partners in New Zealand First were 
increasingly resistant to perpetuate the very policies they had gone into politics to resist, 
particularly in health reform (Fitzsimons, 2000). Many of the policies that they reacted 
against were built on the premise that social capital was supposed to transpose a trickle-
down effect of stability from economics to social capital, which further exposed the 
inequalities generated by market logics. The limits of social capital and competition can be 
thought of in some ways as resulting in Labour’s Third Way (examined in the following 
chapter) as the next step for the politics of welfare and market logics in New Zealand, 
marked by the production of mechanisms for engaging previously marginalised people in 
the employment market. 
 
 
Jenny Shipley; Discursive Practice 
 
The most obvious discursive elements deployed by Shipley in this speech are those of 
competition and inclusion, drawn on as an element of state sanctioned social organisation, 
a general theme that is carried forward to Helen Clark’s discursive practice:  
 
New Zealanders like winning…We want New Zealanders to feel rewarded for their 
effort. We want New Zealanders who need help to have someone to walk beside 
them. 
 
This passage points to an approach of providing universal access to knowledge with a 
heavy emphasis on winners and meritocracy, thus inviting self-improvement. It could also 
be argued that an implicit assumption is that inequality is an inevitable though not 
necessarily completely desirable trait of a healthy society. To have winners one must also 
have losers. The discursive limits of attempting to formulate people as competitors can be 
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linked to a number of material concerns; Shipley’s policy environment produced worsening 
living conditions for many and generated a political counter current organised around 
preserving the welfare state (Crothers, 2000). This culminated in the 1998 ‘Hikoi of Hope’ 
organised by the Anglican Church, drawing 30, 000 people to its cause on the way to 
parliament and gaining the attention of both the Government and opposition. 
 
 
The emphasis on winning and opportunity suggests that people should increasingly “see 
themselves as active subjects, responsible for their own wellbeing” (Larner, 1998, p. 16). 
This is more than a simple moral justification for a decade of reform which undermined 
social solidarity. The passage above and the references to family responsibility elsewhere in 
the speech can be argued to indicate a presence of the ‘liberal dilemma’ (Angus & Brown, 
1998). This dilemma is characterised by a tension between autonomy and privacy. In 
Shipley’s speech, a focus on freedom is contradicted by state intervention into family life. 
This tension would be highlighted again in the CFSR, which exposed a level welfare 
support which failed to provide the basic conditions necessary for responsible parenting; 
“as one response had it; “If the Government wants us to pull up our socks, first it has to 
make sure we have socks”’ (Angus & Brown, 1998, p. 46). As a result, Shipley’s mode of 
Government was recognised by many at the time as a simple “exercise in social 
engineering” (Angus & Brown, 1998, p. 2).  
 
 
Another concept salient to Shipley’s discursive practice is the notion of common sense. 
Unlike John Key, Shipley does not overtly claim to follow a framework of common sense 
in governing, instead alluding to a stabilising consensus on economic issues, suggesting that 
there is only “much less debate” around economic affairs. She further hedges against a total 
acceptance of common sense by pejoratively noting the “pragmatic” line taken by the 
opposition. However, the success of Shipley’s policy prescriptions surrounding fiscal 
responsibility partly rested on their consolidation with a “consensus” on the relationship 
between the state and citizens. This is partially negotiated by drawing an implicit link 
between the human needs of individuals and the management of state finances on terms 
agreeable to international trends, which is suggested to be unsustainable in its present form.  
 
I argue that Shipley’s articulation of “much less debate” surrounding politics marks the 
early stages of stabilising a market led approach to governing health and welfare spending, 
which is increasingly focused on balancing the needs of people against the needs of the 
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market. This balance also suggests an attempt to balance the imperatives of the local and 
global. These balances had proven incommensurable under the fourth Labour Government 
and marginal under Bolger in the early 1990s. However, Bolger’s ‘Millennium Agenda’ 
speech delivered earlier in 1997 suggested that ‘glocalisation’, the simultaneous expression 
of globalisation and consolidation of the local was “the most significant development in 
democracy in the first decade of the 21st century” (Bolger, 1997, p. 16). The balancing act 
of glocalisation is an important development in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand. It 
suggests a new ‘middle ground’ logic for governing welfare through the emergence of social 
capital between financial and social imperatives, and the ‘shadow state’ or ‘third sector’ 
taking up a place between private and public services (Peters & Fitzsimons, 1999).  
 
When Shipley lost the 1999 election the balancing act of glocalisation became crystallised in 
Helen Clark’s Third Way. It can be argued to have partly resulted in the emergence of new 
discourses of unemployment, seen in the “job seeker” (by Helen Clark) and discourses of 
public participation in the share market seen in the “mum and dad investor” (by John Key).  
 
  
Jenny Shipley; Transitive Order 
 
 
The transitive order of this speech reflects the tensions outlined in the previous section. 
This has the effect of foregrounding and foreclosing market logics as the appropriate 
response to a range of existing social problems. The readings of this analysis are also 
supported by those of a similar nature on the CSFR where the representation of individuals 
sits uncomfortably next to those of collectives (Tuffin, Morgan, Frewin, & Jardine, 2000). 
This is represented in ‘The Way Ahead’ through an attempt to define which issues fall 
within the purview of state responsibility and which do not. The analyses below present a 
reading of several passages from the speech that reveal the nature of ‘choice’ to be 
simultaneously enabling and constraining in favour of market logics.  
 
 
There are five actions represented in the passage below, each with grammatical variations 
ascribed to them: 
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The Government will be creating opportunities next year for New Zealanders to be 
involved in this debate. We also need to remember that the 'Government' is you 
and I. And we have personal choices and political choices.  
 
The first, “creating” is represented as having a material outcome in that “New Zealanders” 
are the goal of action. In this way “New Zealanders” becomes an abstract object around 
which political work is oriented. The second action of “involved” is directly related to the 
first, but there is no transfer of agency from one actor to another, positioning “New 
Zealanders” as a homogenous collective entity who only react to Government actions. This 
seems somewhat incongruous with the second statement where “remember” lends both 
actors (the Government and New Zealanders) a human quality. This marks a distinction 
between actions that have an effect on the world and those that do not. This phenomenon 
is apparent elsewhere in speech, where “we” (appearing 45 times in total) is associated with 
choice and mental or material processes attached to the Government; it is constrained in 
these situations by a dualism or list of abstractions that follow it, such as “personal choices 
and political choices”. The passage above can thus be argued to represent a view of reality 
where the Government frames and constrains the nature of choice. This contrasts with 
how other actors in the speech are represented, who carry out action only in limited and 
foreclosed ways, as in the case of “New Zealanders”. This contrast in the representation 
sits awkwardly with Shipley’s overall message of individual and family responsibility.  
 
 
Similarly, a number of other passages within the speech are concerned with the tension of 
balancing apparently mutually exclusive economic and welfare concerns. This reveals the 
way human activities or needs are deactivated or activated, “represented statistically, as if 
they were entities…[or] dynamic processes” (van Leeuwen, 1995, p. 93). In the passage 
below, for example, the social practices associated with health care are replaced by their 
cost: “Even the Labour Opposition recognises an extra billion dollars on health is not the 
solution to the insatiable demand for health care”. One consequence of this representation 
is to lower the importance of health spending relative to other policy areas in the speech. 
The assumption appears to be that as demand for health care is “insatiable” there is no 
point in spending lots of money meeting peoples’ needs. Further to this, the representation 
of health care as a statistic also allows it to be labelled and classified, abstracting its human 
imperatives into a simple matter of funding.   
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Similar patterns can be detected in repayment of debt, which appears immediately after 
issues of health care in Shipley’s speech: “Debt repayment is a key issue. We can't walk 
away from the debt we have accumulated over the last two decades”. The cost of debt 
repayment is represented metonymically through volitional material actions and human 
agency rather than the exchange of arranged sums of money. The act of not repaying debt 
is replaced by action of not walking away. This has the effect of lending debt repayment a 
human quality, in contrast with the statements around healthcare.  
  
I argue that the effect of substituting human need with money and money with human 
behaviour by metonymy is to represent issues of debt repayment on a more legitimate 
plane than those of health spending. Health care is represented as a simple case of money 
while debt repayment is suggested to contain a degree of human importance. This could be 
suggested to reflect the tensions around glocalisaiton outlined earlier.  
 
These grammatical distinctions are significant because they frame the quality of the policy 
backdrop that Shipley developed. They construct a particular view of the health care and 
debt which is ideologically informed. Shipley’s framing of health and economic affairs as a 
dualism in tension, in parallel with the overt construction of the personal and the political 
obfuscates alternative constructions of these domains. They are represented as mutually 
exclusive rather than overlapping and dependent on one another. This reading of tension 
and mutual exclusivity partly illustrates the discursive framing of the fourth National 
Government’s application of market logic to the welfare state.  
 
 
Discussion and Summary 
 
Jenny Shipley’s speech covers some of the broad aims her Government would pursue in 
the term from 1997 until 1999, when Shipley would lose the general election. These were 
organised around the continuing removal of state funded welfare entitlements, 
underpinned by conservative conceptions of community and family life, representing a 
tension between state intervention and the freedom offered by markets.  
 
The discursive order of Shipley’s speech shows an attempt to shift away from the 
communitarian mode of government under Bolger and instead assumes a framework of 
responsibility based increasingly on individual relations. This is in addition to the 
representation of monetary policy as a growing “consensus”, tentatively marking a 
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beginning of the representation of apolitical approaches to governing apparent under the 
following two Governments. The suggestion by Shipley that “New Zealanders like 
winning” revealed a strong construction of people as entrepreneurial subjects, supporting 
the assumption that competition is a necessary component of society.  
 
 
However Shipley’s time as prime minister is labelled, the tensions within her rule appeared 
insurmountable. It is recognised  that Shipley’s libertarian leanings meant that mainstream 
political engagement would reach lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgender voters for the first 
time (Hayward, 2004). However, conservative articulations around family responsibility, 
crystallised in the CFSR, suggested a degree of state intervention and “social engineering” 
in family life (Angus & Brown, 1998, p. 2).  
 
A number of theoretical observations can be attributed to both the analysis of “The Way 
Ahead” and to Shipley’s mode of government more generally. Her limited claims to 
common sense mark a decidedly Gramscian turn for the politics of neo-liberalisation in 
New Zealand. The articulation of market logics as a growing “consensus” could be 
regarded as a fledgling hegemonic form, marked by its relative lack of interdiscursivity and 
intertextuality when compared with the rhetoric of Lange or Bolger. Previous leaders 
negotiated relatively foreign ideological territory in the isolated conditions of 1980s New 
Zealand while future Prime Ministers increasingly grapple with how best to harness New 
Zealand’s market position in global networks.  
 
The social policy backdrop to Shipley’s speech is a fairly obvious indicator that the 
Government was still committed to rolling-back core parts of the welfare state, continuing 
the destructive approach initiated over ten years earlier by the fourth Labour Government. 
However, Shipley’s time as Prime Minister also saw an increased emphasis on social capital. 
Though not referenced directly, it is implicit in the suggestion that “to do well New 
Zealanders need to look after themselves and each other”, as a place holder for the welfare 
state. The theoretical specificity of Shipley’s Government thus lies in the simultaneous 
destruction of the welfare state and the somewhat tendential construction of market led 
combinations of political logics like social capital. Neo-liberalisation under Shipley’s 
Government in some ways marks what Brenner and Theodore (2008) call ‘actually existing 
neo-liberalism’, characterised by the concurrent or even simultaneous destruction and 
construction of logics for governing. 
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3.3  Conclusion: Fourth National Government; 1990-1999 
 
The fourth National Government is sometimes recognised as marking a punitive turn in 
the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand (Crothers, 2000; Mulgan, 2004). This followed an 
already painful period of structural adjustment in New Zealand’s economy from the early 
1980s, initiated by a mixture of international affairs and ideological imperatives in the 
Government and public service. Some evidence does tend to support this claim: the 
removal of compulsory unionism, the withdrawal of the universal family benefit, an 
increase in age for the youth wage, the establishment of a purchaser provider split in health 
care and the replacement of unemployment, sickness, invalids, and domestic purposes 
benefit with a ‘community wage’, to name but a few examples (Kelsey, 1991).  
 
However, a closer examination of both Bolger’s and Shipley’s discursive action suggests 
that there were some contradictions to this. Bolger, for example, deploys a range of 
positions which take the community as a point of departure for policy formulation. While 
somewhat utopian, his images of the cooperative and harmonious “decent society” are 
supported by some strong state institutions, not dissimilar to the civilising project exalted 
by Adam Smith. This includes a strong justice system, free education (including tertiary), 
and extensive public healthcare (Muller, 1993). Bolger’s communitarian approach departs 
from a concern that the economic pressures bought on by the fourth Labour 
Government’s reforms were driving middle class families into hardship while poorer 
families could scarcely afford to exist. The communitarian response is to support parents 
into ‘self-help’ frameworks of raising families.  This can be argued to rebound in favour of 
neo-liberalisation through an early and partially complete emphasis on social capital and 
self-responsibility as the currency for a cohesive society.  
 
Shipley articulates a number of discursive resources based on competition and family 
relations. This marks a slight turn away from Bolger’s communitarianism, deploying 
competition and a more complete conception of social capital as a cohesive component of 
society over duty and a debt to the community. However, the development of the Code of 
Social and Family Responsibility in 1998 marked a turning point for social capital, arguably 
resulting in a more inclusive approach to market led governing revolving around education 
74 
 
and Government partnerships with private institutions (Wolch, 1990), similar to Helen 
Clark’s Third Way. As a result, the development of the CFSR at this juncture can be taken 
to reflect a couple of broad concerns. 
 
Firstly, as Wallace (2000, p. 165) suggests, the ‘Code’ reflects a liberal tension between 
libertarian and conservative values, characteristic of broader styles of government ushered 
in by MMP several years earlier. This might be traced to the relatively conservative nature 
of Shipley’s disaster prone coalition partner, the New Zealand First party, and the 
libertarian leanings of Shipley herself. This disjunction as part of neo-liberalisation is 
characterised by a desire to construct a moral order but contradicted by a reluctance to 
propagate state intervention into people’s lives beyond market forces.  
 
The ‘Code’ and its associated practices of government can also be argued to constitute a 
link with Bolger’s communitarian articulation of ‘glocalisation’, suggesting an emergent 
tension between the establishment of an increasingly global order and the subsequent 
adjustment of the nation state as a civil society. This was raised initially by Jim Bolger in 
1997 under the title ‘From Welfare to Wellbeing’ (also the title of the Ministry of Social 
Development paper from 1994 in a similar vein) and again by Clark in 1998 (Davey, 2000). 
Shipley too, in her opening speech to parliament in 1999, would specifically reference Tony 
Blair’s Government in support of a welfare regime based on support and market 
participation in a globalised environment: 
 
There are very strong similarities with the work being undertaken by the Blair 
Government…Most people want to work. We want to help them, and we are doing 
just that. (Shipley, 1999)  
 
The fourth National Government thus occupies a pivotal moment in the neo-liberalisation 
of New Zealand. It spans a period of reform marked in the beginning by a strong 
monetarist regime and ends in an attempt to solve some of the problems the regime 
generated. This was done by bringing contradictions of reform and its outcomes for 
citizens to the fore and recasting them in terms of responsibility and obligation, creating 
new tensions along the way. The problems which faced the poor and other marginalised 
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people were examined but not solved. This left open the possibility for yet another 
representation of capitalism in the Third Way and an attempt to move beyond the balance 
of human and market needs.  
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4.  The Fifth Labour Government, 1999-2008:  The Third Way and 
 Inclusive-Vehicular Neo-Liberalisation 
 
 
This chapter examines a speech delivered by Helen Clark during the opening of parliament 
in 1999.  While Clark asserted an end to neo-liberalism in her speech to the London School 
of Economics in 2002, her failure to reject the policies of past regimes means that her 
Government can be argued to have softened and thus entrenched the changes of the last 
15 years (Roper, 2011). However, the governing of markets under Clark was carried out in 
a more creative manner than in the past, rolling-out new frameworks for market 
participation through education and technology. The analysis of Clark’s 1999 speech 
reflects this through an examination of discursive forms like “closing the gaps”, 
“information-based economy”, “human capital”, and the “job seeker”.  
 
Helen Clark was New Zealand’s first elected female Prime Minister. She took power in 
November 1999 and governed until 2008 when she resigned as leader of the Labour party 
and from parliament entirely a short while later. Her time as Prime Minister marks a local 
example of the Third Way. This is characterised by an emphasis on the central values of 
social democracy, such as fairness, inclusion, and security, combined with the central tenets 
of free trade and market logics, endeavouring to go beyond the problems of both 
(Fairclough, 2000). This is primarily pursued though education and training in an attempt 
to ‘equip’ people for the harsh world of the employment market, but also focuses on the 
adoption of new technology, science and innovation in order to create new types of 
economic growth (Giddens, 1998).  
 
Clark’s time as Prime Minister emerged from the contradictions of the fourth National 
Government. This was driven partly by the politics of MMP. Shipley failed to keep the 
support of her coalition partner (the New Zealand First party) and led an increasingly 
fragile minority Government into the 1999 general election. After the election, the fifth 
Labour Government engaged in a number of policy initiatives organised around promoting 
participation in the “information-based economy”, characteristic of the Third Way. These 
included interest free student loans, rural access to broadband other information 
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communication technology, family tax credits, an annual increase in minimum wage above 
the rate of inflation, and in 2004 the establishment of ‘Working for Families’ which aimed 
to support low income families “into work” (Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, 
2010, p. ix). Each of these aimed to include people in society through the establishment of 
market relations as a part of everyday life.  
 
The fifth Labour Government’s modus operandi of inclusion closely resembles that of Third 
Way governments internationally, particularly ‘new’ Labour of the United Kingdom. A key 
component of the Third Way since the mid-1990s has been the international networking of 
similarly positioned Governments and political actors. This has played a key role in its 
establishment of the Third Way as a standard for governing in the West (Fairclough, 2000). 
Clark and other senior Labour party members were (and still are) part of this network, 
attending strategic international conferences and meetings.  
 
The notion of a Third Way ideology is a knotty one. It has been described as too diverse 
and fractured to constitute an ideology in its own right (Bastow, Martin, & Pels, 2002; 
Freeden, 2002). The Third Way approach certainly lacks a coherent ‘core’ philosophy, 
revealed in the relatively unstable nature of the ideas its proponents deploy, drawing on 
concepts and values from across the political spectrum. The claim by Clark (2002) to 
follow the Third Way as a coherent programme of government represents a course of 
action not dissimilar to John Key’s anti-ideological stance (examined in the following 
chapter). A Third Way approach to politics represents an attempt to transcend the 
perceived dogma of left-right dualisms, or in Gerhard Schröder’s (Chancellor of Germany, 
1990-1998) terms to manufacture a ‘Neue Mitte’ (‘new middle’).  
 
Some (Bastow et al., 2002; Fairclough, 2000) have identified a ‘Third Way discourse’, 
suggesting that while the ideas and concepts deployed by proponents of the Third Way lack 
a coherent core, they still have a systemic base of meaning. The Third Way discourse can 
be argued to constitute a loose network of ideological and discursive resources, drawn from 
a range of political fields like social democracy and different forms of liberalism. As such, 
the Third Way is a challenge to analyse. Ideas and concepts are taken up in diverse ways 
before being abandoned or modified to meet new challenges.  
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McLennan (2004) adopts a ‘vehicular’ approach to understanding the Third Way, 
suggesting that actors deploy ideas to move from one point to another, mediating between 
contradictory interests before they are abandoned or changed. According to McLennan, 
this is a direct contrast with an ‘oracular’ mode of ideology, characterised by a single 
ambiguous authority, as in conservatism or libertarianism. However, “vehicular ideas have 
something of the principled theory or committed ideology to them…they serve as inclusive 
umbrellas under which quite a range of advocates can shelter, trade and shift their 
alignments and allegiances” (McLennan, 2004, p. 485). I wish to highlight both the network 
and vehicular approaches here; a series of concepts and ideas are deployed by Clark to 
form a loose and mobile network of meaning. These are simple enough to be opposed yet 
flexible enough to be folded back into the sediment of discursive action when 
contradictions are exposed. This is noted particularly in Clark’s deployment of “closing the 
gaps” in relation to Maori vis-à-vis non-Maori (analysed later). 
 
These analyses broadly support present understandings of the Third Way discourse as 
organised around inclusion and an assumption that markets constitute a natural social order 
(Giddens, 1998). However, as well as attending to the more commonly accepted features of 
the Third Way discourse such as the “information-based economy”, “job seeker”, and 
“human capital”, Clark also reveals some features specific to New Zealand. These revolve 
predominantly around the Treaty of Waitangi and the governing of Maori by 
mainstreaming ethnicity through “capacity building” in the state apparatus. This can be 
argued to result in a framework for self-governance, overlapping with rangatiratanga (self-
determination) and rebounding in favour of self-responsibility. Each of these points is 
implicit in the politics of inclusion, reflected throughout Clark’s 1999 speech.  
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4.1  Helen Clark: Speech from the Throne Opening Of Parliament, 1999  
 
This speech reflects Clark’s commitment to the Third Way. It contains a number of broad 
statements detailing the aims that the new Government will follow. These revolve around 
the Treaty of Waitangi and the support she draws from the Alliance and Green parties. She 
also outlines some of the Labour party’s more significant policies, including the 
establishment of Industry New Zealand. This is to provide advice on economic 
development and the aim “to build a modern, progressive system of employment relations 
which is responsive to both human needs and the demands of a rapidly changing 
economy”. Clark then posits a shift from “competition” to “cooperation” in the funding of 
healthcare, vowing to remove the frameworks of commercial imperatives governing public 
health systems. Finally, Clark asserts strong support for the “voluntary” sector and its role 
in establishing frameworks of social security in place of state funded support. 
 
 
Helen Clark; Discursive Order 
 
The order of discourse surrounding Clark’s inclusive and mobile moment in the trajectory 
of neo-liberalisation reveals a strong emphasis on education, employment, and the Treaty 
of Waitangi. Clark also recognises New Zealand’s position as firmly entrenched within 
relatively open global networks of exchange, not only in terms of trade, but also 
immigration, education, and communication. Thus, Clark authors her speech around these 
developments, while also limiting utterances through references to the failures of past 
Governments to take advantage of global networks: 
 
Underlying this volatility are major structural problems which have not been 
addressed by the radical reforms undertaken since 1984. The current account deficit 
is very large, reflecting both mediocre export performance and poor levels of 
savings. 
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Despite the suggestion that the reforms of 1984 were “radical”, the suggestion that the 
“account deficit is very large” and the exports are “mediocre” takes much of their 
substance for granted.  Clark is also partly authored by the apparent failings of Shipley’s 
attempts to dictate the relationship between family and the state. The “knowledge-based” 
economy (below) provides something of a strategic move towards a qualitatively different 
mode of political production, emphasising state supported development through education: 
 
New Zealand’s skills production in those areas relevant to the new knowledge-
based industries has been inadequate. A competitive model in tertiary education has 
led to unsatisfactory outcomes in terms of both the quality and the appropriateness 
of the skills produced. 
 
This passage also reveals some key assumptions about New Zealand’s natural place in 
capitalist networks of education and innovation. The “new” economy is represented as 
something that New Zealand has missed and must inevitably make up for. This pattern is 
also discernable in Lange’s articulation of structural adjustment to global market conditions 
from 1987, and is established through a slippage between description and prescription. A 
similar pattern can be observed here. In the quote above, the state of affairs is a lack of 
appropriate skills as a result of an inappropriate model for education, indicating a policy 
prescription of establishing a new or different type of organisation for education.  
 
This is significant because the relationship between a represented reality and policy is in 
some ways imaginary. It “can generate imaginary representations of how the world will be 
or should be within strategies for change which, if they achieve hegemony, can be 
operationalized to transform these imaginaries into realities” (Fairclough, 2006, p. 22). The 
hegemonic position of the “new knowledge-based” economy is debatable. It certainly has 
material effects and policy outcomes, but it is far from stabilized which can be noted in its 
failure to reappear when Clark’s rule comes to an end.  
 
Clark squares the assumptions of a market governed knowledge-economy with a social 
democratic agenda, basing quality of life on “opportunity”, on par with most other 
speakers analysed in this project. However, “opportunity” in Clark’s case is linked to 
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education and identity: “The aim is to expand job opportunities and wealth creation based 
on the arts as well as to promote New Zealand’s identity”. 
 
This is a contrast with other speakers who link “opportunity” primarily to the flexibility of 
labour markets. The element of “opportunity” thus comes to constitute and strengthen the 
“information-based” economy (elsewhere in the speech) as a nodal point, the place in the 
discursive order where globality, education, welfare, culture, and trade come together, albeit 
fleetingly.  
 
Clark also speaks at length about the Treaty of Waitangi and inequality: 
 
Article III of the treaty implies equality in the rights of citizenship…As long as the 
economic and social gaps between Maori and other New Zealanders remain large, 
the Government of New Zealand cannot claim to have addressed the needs of all 
New Zealanders. My Government is committed to closing the gaps. 
 
“Closing the gaps” for Clark’s Government is predominantly concerned with the role of 
education and training, thus providing the “opportunity” to work and reducing poverty. 
Clark’s conceptions of the Treaty of Waitangi and its significance to New Zealand are not 
altogether different from Palmer’s suggestions of its institutionalisation. However, the 
Treaty in this case becomes a nodal point in its own right, something that could not be said 
of Palmer’s articulation. Palmer’s arguments for institutionalising the Treaty clashed with 
some of the more significant market led government action at the time. Under Clark, the 
Treaty is equated with an overall approach to government, including social welfare, 
education, employment, ethnicity, and belonging, all of which fit within the inclusive 
approach of Clark’s Third Way.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Clark’s speech is the declaration that her 
Government recognises the problems surrounding the market led policy of the last 15 
years, but then constructs a much wider and more general set of discourses which take 
these structures as a natural social order. The declaration of a commitment to “pragmatic 
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change in the interests of the many” reveals a shift in the direction of consensus within 
market logics. Through the failures and inconsistencies generated by the fourth Labour and 
National Governments, the mode of government can be argued to have shifted tack 
towards an inclusive moment in neo-liberalisation, rolling out mechanisms for induction 
into market functions. The “pragmatic” approach also points to the now stabilised nature 
of market logics, taking them one step further than Shipley’s somewhat cautious approach 
of “much less debate” surrounding economic development.  
 
Clark’s 1999 speech thus represents part of a break from past leaders. Destructive neo-
liberalisation encountered a number of issues under Shipley, where leadership, policy, and 
future aims appeared increasingly incongruous to lived experience. This was particularly 
apparent around the Code of Family and Social Responsibility, the moral construction of 
families as self-dependent and individuals as entrepreneurial. Clark’s nodal point of the 
“knowledge-based” economy, under which a number of further assumptions of education, 
welfare, and identity become possible, can be read as a response to Shipley’s moral mode of 
government. The elements of discourse in Clark’s speech also echo those deployed in 
international contexts by other Third Way actors (like Tony Blair, discussed later), though 
some remain specific to New Zealand in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi.  
 
 
Helen Clark; Discursive Practice 
 
While Clark draws her discursive material from mainly economic concerns, she also 
articulates issues related to the Treaty of Waitangi, youth affairs, education, environmental 
protection and management, the arts, and employment. In each of these areas, Clark 
suggests her Government will follow what appears on the surface to be a social democratic 
approach, including state intervention in a range of areas considered at present to be 
governed by market forces. The articulations within these areas of policy reveal Clark’s 
‘inclusive’ approach at its most basic level. However, as this analysis shows the discursive 
resources Clark draws upon create a range of tensions and inconsistencies that do not 
necessarily overlap with wider commitments to social justice. This reveals the vehicular, 
temporary, and often mediating (McLennan, 2004) nature of Clark’s ideas. These include 
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terms such as “closing the gaps”, “human capital”, the “new” knowledge economy, and 
“job seeker”, each travelling with a range of ideological elements attached. Perhaps the 
most obvious effects of this are revealed by “closing the gaps”: 
  
These measures will be structured around an overall programme of capacity 
assessment and capacity building which will be central to closing the gaps in a way 
consistent with Treaty obligations. Closing the gaps for Maori and improving the 
nation’s overall health status means tackling the poverty and associated illnesses 
 
“Closing the gaps” was a phrase adopted by the Labour Party before the election. It was 
abandoned just one year into the coalition’s first term  after attacks from within Parliament 
and the public: it was labelled by Winston Peters as ‘social apartheid’ (New Zealand First 
Party, 2000). The term gives rise to a degree of ambiguity because of the different contexts 
and discourses it was deployed in, intersecting social justice, the Treaty of Waitangi, and 
social cohesion (Humpage & Fleras, 2001). At least in its infancy it implied a socio-
economic gap. But as the passages above show, the content of the term is left open and 
mobile, revealing a number of interpretations and limitations.  
 
One possible understanding of “closing the gaps” is the way the gap is cast specifically as a  
Maori problem, as an issue of under accumulation vis-á-vis others. To this end, any policy 
formulation or structural adjustment is done so on the terms of the dominant group, and it 
can be argued that this fails to fundamentally challenge the systemic basis of inequality, 
based on a mixture of institutional disadvantage and normative cultural assumptions 
around the nature of success. The drive to induct people into health and employment 
systems as a way of “closing the gaps” is exemplary of Clark’s inclusive approach to 
government.   
 
While the label of “closing the gaps” was dropped, the policy content remained fairly 
consistent. This included a greater emphasis on including Maori people, customs, and 
knowledge in state departments, referred to as “capacity building”. This was partly an 
“emphasis on strengthening governance, human capital, and infrastructure, so indigenous 
peoples can govern themselves and determine their own path of development” (Humpage 
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& Fleras, 2001, p. 49). While this could not be labelled as an overt attempt at decentralising 
the state, the adoption of rangatiratanga (self-determination) as a logic for “capacity 
building” rebounds by creating a framework of self-governance and thus a reduced role for 
the state.  
 
Clark also makes references to the nature of the employment market. Once again, this 
marks a divergence from previous speakers through its inclusive nature and also through a 
casting of workers as “capital”. This marks a contrast with Lange’s attention to the 
“livelihoods” of people which were represented as dependent on the labour market in his 
1987 speech. Clark asserts that: 
 
Central to the new information-based economy which is emerging is the growth of 
human capital. We need to improve substantially both the quality and the nature of 
the skills that our people possess. 
 
The concept of “human capital” emerged from the work of Adam Smith's economics as a 
popular object of interest for economists in the 1960s, in tandem with the rise of free 
market economics (Ayers, 2005). More recent utterances like Clark’s tend to link the term 
to the ‘knowledge economy’ (seen here as the “information-based economy”) as a means 
of measuring human agency against economic performance. In the simplest interpretation, 
“human capital” casts workers as a resource on which to draw, as “a mere factor of 
production” (Harvey, 2005, p. 167). In this sense, the value of a human may vary 
depending on the extent of their inclusion in networks of knowledge, education, and 
training. This is revealed in Clark’s speech through an overwhelming emphasis on the 
politics of inclusion (in education, healthcare, technology, and the arts, for example) rather 
than of poverty or exclusion (mentioned only twice). This is identifiable in the Third Way 
globally, through professions to go beyond a simple redistribution of resources to a 
recognition that redistribution has problems of itself that need to be overcome, as if the 
two are mutually exclusive. Generally the assumption is that the problems of redistribution 
can be overcome through education, so that people are simply ‘worth more’ and will not 
require state support (Fairclough, 2000). 
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This approach to governing labour conditions is reflected in several of the Labour 
Government’s employment policies. For example, the ‘Modern Apprenticeships Initiative’ 
of 2000 assisted young people with basic trades training and qualifications. It aimed to 
“make it easy for employers to recruit and train talented young people and provide them 
with an opportunity to gain a nationally recognised qualification” (Tertiary Education 
Commission, 2009). Similarly, the extension of broadband and ICT resources to remote 
rural areas was underpinned by a desire to expand educational resources to those who 
previously had no or limited access to them, thus expanding “human capital” through 
networks of communication and knowledge.  
 
Another concept related to “human capital” is the recasting of the unemployed as “job-
seekers”. The “job-seeker” sees the crystallisation of entrepreneurial subjects established 
under earlier speakers, like Mike Moore’s “battler”. It suggests a degree of self-
responsibility for participation in the employment market. For example, if one’s “human 
capital” is not sufficiently developed, then one faces the possibility of exclusion, as Harvey 
(2005, p. 157) notes: 
  
If conditions among the lower classes deteriorated, this was because they failed, 
usually for personal and cultural reasons, to enhance their own human capital 
(through dedication to education, the acquisition of a Protestant work ethic, 
submission to work discipline and flexibility, and the like). 
 
The “job-seeker” is thus more than entrepreneurial, and comes endowed with a number of 
obligations and needs to go with rights of state support: 
 
Individual needs for job-seekers will be identified through new programmes which 
will ensure quality case management. It is the intention to ensure that no young 
person leaves school to go on the dole. 
 
At the most basic level, this passage points to a range of assumptions that underpin the 
treatment of the unemployed as compelled to engage with society on an economically 
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productive level. People are to become entrepreneurs of their own employment to avoid 
going “on the dole”. In order to achieve this the “job-seeker” is assumed to have a range of 
duties: training, attending interviews, extoling one’s employable virtues and flexibility in 
relation to workplace practice, meeting with benefit case managers, and so on (Fodge, 
2008). The position of the “job-seeker” is thus imbued with a degree of self-governance to 
the point where it takes on an identity of its own, producing a range of regulatory 
procedures, expectations, and practices that go beyond simple unemployment (Fodge, 
2008). These readings of the “job-seeker” are supported and reflected by the wholesale 
rebranding of unemployment undertaken by new Labour in the United Kingdom, outlined 
shortly.  
 
The recasting of unemployment in terms of job-seeking reflects a shift in the state’s role of 
regulating unemployment. Job-seeking is cast as the responsibility of the individual with a 
degree of support from the state. It follows through regulatory practice that to claim a state 
benefit and not engage in job-seeking practice is to reject support and to be labelled deviant 
(terms like “dole bludger” or “waster” are all too common in relation to unemployment). 
By extension, the discourse of the job-seeker can also be argued to contain some notion 
risk of management, where state investment in “human capital” should see some kind of 
return. This can be seen as a mediating factor which both minimises the impact on scarce 
public funds and enhances the seeker’s chance of gaining employment, thereby 
contributing to the economic well-being of the country. While not directly related to 
unemployment, this is exemplified in the fifth Labour Government’s establishment of 
interest free student loans for tertiary education.  
 
The discourse of the job-seeker is not new or unique to New Zealand. It first made its 
appearance under Clark’s Government through a structural review of key benefits, 
including the re-separation of the sickness and unemployment benefits. It was also 
deployed by Michael Cullen (a senior member of the fifth Labour Government) in 1993, 
suggesting the futility of entrepreneurial action against market forces in “a fruitless round 
of job-seeking and door-knocking”  (Cullen, 1993). 
 
The concept of the job-seeker is also associated with Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ regime in 
the United Kingdom, which engaged in a wholesale re-branding of unemployment support. 
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This included the name of the benefit (‘Job-Seekers’ Allowance’) and offices (‘Job Centre 
Plus’). Indeed, the “job-seeker” can be recognised as a microcosm of the relative mobility 
of Third Way discourses globally. Interdiscursivity and intertextuality are salient here. A key 
characteristic that Fairclough (2000) notes of the Third Way is the extent to which policies 
and practices are justified explicitly against international events with similar ideological 
features. That is, followers of the Third Way draw on each other for ideological and 
discursive support. The “job-seeker” thus represents a case for a degree of change, 
supporting the point that Clark’s articulations represent part of a wider break in the neo-
liberalisation of New Zealand, towards a more creative approach to government 
characterised by a roll-out of new combinations of political and market logics.   
 
In sum, we might recognise Clark’s articulations as distinct type of Third Way discourse. It 
is informed in particular by the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi, but also more 
generally by an emergent and mobile discourse of an international Third Way, noting the 
influences of Tony Blair and the Third Way ‘network’ (Fairclough, 2000). The relatively 
high instances of interdiscursivity and intertextuality, drawn predominantly from 
Anglophone discourses of the Third Way in the United Kingdom suggest a slight change of 
direction for neo-liberalisation in New Zealand. However, both “closing the gaps” and the 
“job-seeker” can be argued to represent a failure to fundamentally challenge the reforms 
carried out by prior Governments (Roper, 2011). The Third Way approach taken by the 
fifth Labour Government seeks to realise human needs within established market norms. 
There are however some contradictions to this trend, which are revealed through the 
analysis of Clark’s grammatical representations. 
 
 
Helen Clark: Transitive Order 
 
The transitive order of this speech reveals some implicit assumptions surrounding the 
position of Maori and markets in relation to inequality in New Zealand.  I noted in 
previous paragraphs that inequality was recognised through a deficit approach, as a 
problem of a lack of accumulation by Maori vis-á-vis others, as in the quote analysed 
earlier: 
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As long as the economic and social gaps between Maori and other New Zealanders 
remain large, the Government of New Zealand cannot claim to have addressed the 
needs of all New Zealanders. My Government is committed to closing the gaps 
 
The effect of problematizing Maori is achieved through a range of strategies. The most 
obvious of these is the way “Maori” as an abstract classifying category is used to refer to 
people. On the one hand, it is a relatively specific referential practice, suggesting a distinct 
group with a coherent collective identity, while “other New Zealanders” can refer to a 
bewildering array of people. Conversely, a common critique levelled at the New Zealand 
state and Government (both predominantly Pakeha dominated institutions) is the 
paternalistic and homogenous approach to policy regarding often specific interests of 
regionalised iwi, and a failure to distinguish between different tribal and sub-tribal groups 
(Bell, 2004).  
 
The construction of a Maori deficit is further revealed throughout the speech; the 
deployment of “Maori” never appears in conjunction with any specific person or action. 
Maori are simply cast passively in poverty, contracting disease, and lacking vis-á-vis others. 
The impetus for action is located solely with the Government, as in “My Government is 
committed to closing the gaps”. This arguably marks a contradiction with the inclusive 
approach to rule and self-governance postulated in this speech and elsewhere. 
 
Another feature of note in this speech is Clark’s representation of the “market”. This 
concerns a combination of managed and free market principles. The term “market” 
appears five times in this speech, three times in ways fitting a managed approach and twice 
in ways consistent with a free market agenda: 
  
My Government recognises that simply relying upon market forces will not deliver 
these changes. 
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Legislation will be introduced to abolish the private insurance market for statutory 
accident compensation provision. 
 
It is important that we do not forget that social security was a systematic answer to 
the failure of purely market-based or voluntary responses. 
  
Centres will be established to enable graduate students and staff, whose work has 
commercial relevance, to prepare their work for transfer to the marketplace. 
  
These moves will, over time, reduce the pressure on the low income end of the 
private rental market thus reducing the rate of increase in spending. 
 
In the first three extracts above, the “market” is recognised as something that can be 
affected in its totality through human intervention. “Recognises”, for example, emphasises 
human agency and mental processes. The “Government” is lent a human quality in order 
to distance it from its supposed antithesis (the market) and to give it material grounding. 
The action “recognises” is also volitional and active, while for other speakers many actions 
concerning the market are non-volitional and solely reactive. This has the effect of 
emphasising Government power over market forces. Similarly, in the second passage the 
action of “abolish” is totalizing. The question ‘why would the market do that?’ is irrelevant 
as the answer is readily foreclosed in the action of the Government, suggesting a degree of 
influence over the market.  
 
In the third passage, the market is recognised as a deficient answer to a range of human 
needs. The reasons why this failure might have occurred are replaced by the noun “failure”. 
The market has no tangible action and the Government is represented as responding in a 
“systematic” (suggesting calculation and rationality) manner. This suggests that a range of 
interventions are both possible and desirable.  
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The last two passages present something of a contrast. In the fourth passage, for example, 
the “market-place” is recognised as an a priori object, a natural order for the dissemination 
of knowledge and research. This is achieved through the use of “transfer” as a noun; the 
transfer has no actual effect on the market because it occurs in a contingent space in the 
future (it has not actually occurred yet). What happens to the knowledge after it reaches the 
market is to be left to the forces which are presumed to determine its price and function. 
The volition of the actors who are represented (teachers and students) is limited by the 
market place, thus constructing the market as an abstract entity unto itself rather than the 
sum of its participants. Similarly, in the final passage, a distinct image of the housing 
market is constructed through the representation of its forces in relation to human agency. 
The market is naturalised by the incomplete nature of the nominalization “reducing 
pressure”. The action of “reducing”, apart from taking place in a contingent space where it 
impossible to say what drives the reduction, is also limited; its effect on the market is not 
complete and can thus be taken to represent the limits of human agency against the 
tumultuous nature of market forces.  
 
The transitive order of these passages represents something of a microcosm of Clark’s 
Third Way. The mobile nature of her ideas is apparent at the discursive and transitive 
levels. Within the space of a couple of paragraphs the structure and semantics surrounding 
the “market” shifts in different directions, highlighting first its malleability and then the 
inevitability of its forces. Similarly with “closing the gaps”, the ‘gap’ in relation to Maori 
only functions for a marginal part of Clark’s overall speech. The referential and 
foregrounding practices of “Maori” reveal the extent to which the ‘gap’ is less an object of 
social policy and more a concept used to travel a little further along the road to market 
inclusion on the grounds of ethnicity and market cosmopolitanism.  
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4.2  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The speech titled “Speech From The Throne Opening Of Parliament” delivered by Helen 
Clark early in 1999 marked the beginning of a local iteration of the Third Way (Giddens, 
1998). This is characterised by a synthesis of market logic and social democratic values in 
an attempt to go beyond the problems of both. However, this approach has been criticised 
for taking the central tenets of free markets for granted, thus perpetuating their more 
pervasive effects, such as the structural inequality which results from market competition 
(Fairclough, 2000). Advocates of the Third Way, like Helen Clark, endeavour to overcome 
these problems by ‘equipping’ people for the harsh world of markets, often through 
education and technology.  
 
The analysis of Clark’s speech focused on three key terms. Firstly, “closing the gaps” 
revealed an assumption that the “gap” (indicating an unequal distribution of money, 
knowledge and health) was a Maori problem of under-accumulation vis-á-vis others. This 
reading of the deficit model was supported in the transitive analysis through an 
examination of the ways that Maori are represented as passive in comparison to an active 
Government. Secondly, I examined the concept of the “job-seeker”, which was seen to 
invite a degree of self-governance, compelling particular types of regulatory behaviour in 
relation to employment market participation. The “job-seeker” also highlights some fairly 
obvious parallels with developments in New Labour Third Way of the United Kingdom.  
 
Finally, I examined the concept of “human capital” and its relationship with the “new” 
type of economics which Clark avers to follow. This noted the way humans are positioned 
as a “mere factor of production” (Harvey, 2005, p. 167)  in the “new” knowledge economy. 
It was argued that this in itself is not “new”, though the ways in which those deploying it 
actively seek to include people in the employment market marks a break from previous 
speakers. This was noted in the arguably destructive phases of earlier neo-liberalisations, 
where frameworks for inclusion, like the welfare state, were simply removed in an attempt 
to ‘incentivise’ people into work. Under Clark’s Third Way approach, a number of ‘creative’ 
frameworks replace this and governmental tools (like the “job-seeker” and a number of 
education and training schemes) actively induct people into the employment market.  
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While it is quite clear that this speech marks a departure from previous moments of neo-
liberalisation in New Zealand, it is with caution that I advance any kind of unifying 
conclusion as to the impact of the Third Way on continued neo-liberalisation and market 
logic as a coherent framework for governing. The evidence from the analysis in this chapter 
suggests that the entrenchment and development of market logics continued under Clark, 
albeit in more mobile and shifting ways. A number of policy manoeuvres outlined in 
Clark’s speech challenged some of the previous Governments’ rhetoric, but did not 
fundamentally reshape the discursive order or the challenge New Zealand’s place as a 
market society, as she would argue in her 2002 speech to the London School of Economics 
(Clark, 2002). 
 
By way of conclusion, I offer some basic observations surrounding Clark’s position in the 
trajectory of neo-liberalisation in New Zealand as well as some theoretical pointers by 
returning to McLennan’s (2004) notion of vehicular ideology. As noted in the introduction, 
Clark’s speech can be argued to mark an “inclusive” (Craig & Porter, 2003, p. 54) moment 
in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand. This is characterised by a loose aggregate of 
catchwords and phrases and associated ideas like “job-seeker”, “human capital”, and 
“closing the gaps”. I argue that these are used for limited purposes and then either 
abandoned or re-worked in light of previous contradictions, which is a direct contrast with 
the more ‘oracular’ or prophetic properties of previous ideological forms (like Bolger’s 
communitarianism or Palmer’s technocracy). For example, “closing the gaps” as a narrative 
for social welfare was abandoned just one year into the Labour coalition’s first term, 
though much of its policy content remained in the form of training incentives for 
employees and other state supported education frameworks like interest free student loans. 
 
The vehicular nature of ideological forms theorised by McLennan (2004) are more than 
temporally mobile, they also mobile in their meanings. The “market”, as discussed through 
the transitive order of Clark’s 1999 speech, represents a microcosm of this and the way the 
Third Way in New Zealand operates more generally. The signifier of the “market” changes 
several times, first in a pejorative sense to describe the policies of the opposition, then to 
naturalise the functions of cycles of employment, and finally to describe Labour’s approach 
to international export policies. This use of “market” extends an understanding of mobility 
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in limited ways. McLennan (2004, p. 485) argues that these networks of shifting and 
unstable meaning are somewhat self-sustaining: “it is not just that they are shaped by 
mobile cultural networks; the rubric and rhetoric themselves play a key role in constituting 
these networks”.  
 
Similarly, through a vehicular lens, “human capital” and “job seeker” each take on a 
mediating role, solving the problems encountered in earlier representations of the 
employment market, centred as they were on the concerns of employers and market forces. 
The “job-seeker”, for example, can be constructed as a way of overcoming the positioning 
of the unemployed as passive recipients of state support, as ‘bludgers’ as the stigma would 
have it, instead endowing them with a degree of agency and empowerment. Similarly, the 
“information-based economy” can be taken to represent a response to the rapid decline in 
manufacturing and blue collar work experienced in New Zealand over the last 20 years and 
“moving things on” to suggest a different mode of production (McLennan, 2004, p. 485). 
 
If we regard the Third Way as part of “a vehicular nomenclature” (McLennan, 2004, p. 
486) rather than a systematic theory of government, the array of catch phrases and shifting 
ideas become somewhat clearer. Clark’s version of neo-liberalisation, under the heading of 
the Third Way, can be more than just inclusive. Its nature is constructed by the very 
mobility of the ideas deployed and its flexibility to absorb criticism back into a matrix of 
shifting ideological forms. One might, with a nod to McLennan, label it ‘inclusive-vehicular 
neo-liberalisation’. 
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5.  The Fifth National Government, 2008-2013: The Private 
 Regulation of Public Space and the Market Ideology 
 
This chapter examines a speech delivered by Prime Minister John Key in 2011. The ‘State 
of the Nation’ speech lays out the fifth National Government’s concern on a range of 
economic issues. The analyses note a range of features which position Key at the end of 
two decades of often contradictory and unstable market led rule. In addition to this, Key 
pursues his own distinct agenda which is often represented as apolitical, representing 
market forces as an ideological logic for governing in themselves, marking a break with 
previous speakers.  
 
The fifth National Government was elected in 2008 with coalition support from the Maori, 
United Future, and Act Parties. John Key took the seat of Prime Minister under the utopian 
campaign narrative of building “a brighter future”. The new coalition followed the defeat 
of Helen Clark’s Labour Government, which had come under fire due to a large budget 
deficit partly bought on by the increasingly challenging conditions of international finance. 
By 2008, this had developed into what most agreed to be a global recession, exposing a 
number of contradictions, inadequacies, and flaws in market logic as a basis for public 
management. However, in keeping with advice from the World Bank, IMF, and OECD, 
the new Government allowed the deficit to reach “record levels” and thus implemented a 
range of policies around cutting public sector costs as an emergency measure (Roper, 2011, 
p. 13). 
 
While Clark professed to end neo-liberalism in New Zealand in 2002, her Government 
failed to fundamentally challenge the basis of 20 years of reform. Clark’s inclusive ethos 
thus softened but also entrenched the diverse market logics of the last two decades (Roper, 
2011). On winning the election, Key challenged Clark’s inclusive approach to rule, 
emphasising the importance of the private sector and small businesses for economic 
growth. Key’s response to the economic crisis of 2008 and thus his position in the neo-
liberalisation of New Zealand is a particularly important one. Through the 2008 crisis, the 
dominant mode of social and political organisation faced a degree of criticism and 
resistance (noted in the global “Occupy” movement, for example). The overwhelming 
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response to recession by the National led Government was to further pursue market logic 
as a fundamental basis for governing.  
 
A few key policy platforms have dominated the fifth National Government’s two terms as 
of early 2013. The increased privatisation of state-owned companies was announced early 
in Key’s second term. This was labelled a “mixed ownership model” and involves the 
public sale of shares in Mighty River Power, Meridian Energy, Genesis Energy, Solid 
Energy, and Air New Zealand. In December 2008, a 90 day ‘hire and fire’ bill was 
implemented, allowing employers of 20 people or less to fire new employees within 90 days 
without notice or reason (Tait, 2008). This was represented as encouraging businesses to 
take on new employees with reduced risk. On October 1st 2010, the flat goods and service 
tax (originally introduced in 1986 under David Lange) increased from 12.5 to 15 per cent. 
At the time of writing, the Government was also negotiating a number of free trade 
agendas behind closed doors. These are labelled the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
which aims to liberalise a number of economies in the Pacific region. The Government has 
also established charter schools and privately run prisons on a trial basis, and in May 2013 
the youth wage is to be re-introduced at $11 per-hour (the previous minimum was $13.75) 
for workers aged under 19. 
 
In general, the fifth National Government’s approach to rule has been market led and 
represented as pragmatic. This was partly achieved through the discursive work of several 
senior members of the National party, but also through events like the return of Don Brash 
to politics in 2011 (Phelan, 2012). Brash, an ex-leader of the National party (2003-2006), 
returned to parliament by rolling the leader of the market radical Act Party, Rodney Hide, 
and publically repudiating Key and the National party. As Phelan (2012) notes, this enabled 
Key and his Government to relegate Brash’s radical ideology to the periphery of politics, 
thus representing their own position as a moderate one. Similarly, the financial crisis of 
2008 lent a degree of urgency to a number of market led policies (like increased 
privatisation), which aligned with the National party’s existing philosophies.  
 
This chapter examines Key’s discourses of neo-liberalisation in some detail, noting their 
cultural and historical features as well as some of their impacts in relation to the 
stabilisation of market logics in New Zealand. It concludes by suggesting that Key 
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represents a potentially profound moment in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand 
through his self-claimed ‘anti-ideological’ position, arguably resulting in the establishment 
of a rigid market ideology as a rubric for governing.  
 
 
5.1  John Key: State of the Nation, 2011 
 
This speech is delivered in an election year after a relatively stable term from 2008. The 
most dramatic change represented in this speech is the partial privatization of a number of 
state owned enterprises. The broad aims of Key’s Government are organised around 
generating a socio-political environment conducive to private enterprise, which “ostensibly 
aimed at creating greater prosperity for all” (Roper, 2011, p. 13). Indeed, this speech might 
be better framed as the “State of the Economy”, indicating the discursive effects of the 
2008 financial crisis.  
 
The speech begins by noting that Key will predominantly focus on the economy as the 
lynch pin for tackling existing crises in employment, wages, and property value. Before 
noting some of his more significant policies, Key suggests that if they are not taken up then 
“we risk missing the boat”, referring to a fall back into recession. This marks something of 
a parallel with strategies deployed by both David Lange and Helen Clark in relation to their 
respective reforms of the employment market as having no viable alternative. Key then 
briefly outlines the backdrop his Government is working from, suggesting that the 
Treasury were “projecting no end to budget deficits” when he first took office. The speech 
goes on to outline a largely pro-business framework, aimed at furthering economic 
development and “balancing” the Government books “more quickly”. This aim also 
precipitated the entry of credit rating agencies into the political lexicon of New Zealand, a 
feature on which Key’s market ideology is partly based. 
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John Key: Discursive Order 
 
The overwhelming bulk of the speech is dedicated to detailing and justifying supply side 
economic planning:  
 
We hauled back new budget spending allowances and reduced the size of the 
bureaucracy…We have progressed an ambitious free trade agenda. And we 
introduced a number of regulatory changes to make it easier to do business. 
 
These utterances are partially built on the assumptions of economic success constructed 
during the prior 27 years of change, focused on removing bureaucracy and creating 
conditions conducive to profit. One could argue that following the ‘vehicular’ (McLennan, 
2004) mediation undertaken by Helen Clark surrounding the problems of inequality in free 
markets, Key is in a position which allows the wholesale articulation of market freedom 
and fiscal restraint as a matter of pragmatic government. The fact that the “free trade 
agenda” is “ambitious” is apparently not cause for concern and marks an appearance of 
market logics in their most complete form of the speakers examined thus far. The passage 
above could be constructed as a crystallised articulation of Jenny Shipley’s “much less 
debate as to how modern economies work”. Similarly, David Lange spoke at length on 
removing bureaucracy in 1987, outlining the various ways in which this could benefit the 
economy. For Key, there is neither debate nor elaboration. The conditions which result 
from free trade and removing bureaucracy are supposed to be self-evident, arguably 
marking an articulation of market logics in their most naturalised form yet.  
 
The construction of apolitical government (below) supports the stabilisation of market 
logics. While other authors proclaim “pragmatic” (Helen Clark) or “responsible” (Mike 
Moore) government, Key is the only speaker to openly react against ideology, despite his 
opening paragraphs declaring a utopian future of opportunity and prosperity based on 
production and investment: “In particular, I want to stress that the Government is 
interested in what works, not in following any particular ideology”. 
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This can be argued to reflect Terry Eagleton’s (1991, p. 2) suggestion that ideology is like 
“bad breath”; it is always the property of the other. In this sense, Key’s logic can be argued 
to reflect not only the tendency to represent certain policy outcomes as inevitable, but also 
the late capitalist condition where much broader patterns of discursive production and 
consumption are dominated by disavowals of ideology (Phelan, 2012). In some ways, this 
can be related to technocratic discourses like Palmer’s. Key’s disavowal of ideology is 
linked to an increasingly apparent influence of expert and empiricist government, noted in 
his deployment of the credit rating agency Standard and Poor as a justification for pursuing 
fiscal balance (discussed shortly).  
 
This is a significant observation because it represents a new moment in the neo-
liberalisation of New Zealand that suggests yet another shift, both for the state apparatus 
and for ideology. In this speech, the shift is partly characterised by a reaction against the 
‘inclusive’ policies of the fifth Labour Government, noted particularly in relation to a fiscal 
deficit. Phelan (2012, p. 16) argues that moves like this are concerned more with a 
“marketing” strategy or “product placement” in relation to oppositional ideological forms. 
For example, the 2008 recession exposed a number of problems around public spending 
which allowed Key to position his approach of taking “responsible decisions” and pursuing 
“an ambitious free trade agenda” as congruous with prevailing market conditions and that 
“any party that wants to ramp up spending is being economically irresponsible”.  
 
Key’s apolitical and anti-ideological position is also partly achieved through the use of 
entrepreneurialism as a placeholder for share market participation and privatisation. Key 
makes clear that to be engaged in his expansion of free market activity one should join the 
ranks of entrepreneurialism, indicated by the well-recognised shibboleth “mum and dad 
investor” and the resulting deployment of market logics as a rubric for social life: 
 
I can see a strong appetite from New Zealand investors for participation in a mixed 
ownership model. Between KiwiSaver, other managed funds, iwi, mum and dad 
investors and the Government’s own investment arms – including the Super Fund 
– there is a very substantial capacity to invest in quality New Zealand assets. 
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This is arguably indicative of what Gramsci (1992) termed the contradictory consciousness, 
a component of the hegemonic maintenance of a balance between coercion and consent 
and the “illusory nature of self-determination in capitalist societies” (Roper, 2011, p. 15). 
Here the anti-ideological position which Key articulates takes on a much more historically 
pertinent meaning. In Key’s rejection of the politics of ideology he is authored almost 
completely by the politics of market exchange. In distancing himself from ideology in this 
manner, Key represents a moment in neo-liberalisation where market logics become 
embedded almost beyond recognition, as a prosaic formation of rules and regulations for 
the practices of governing.  
 
“Invest” or “investment”, for example, are mentioned 30 times throughout the speech: 
they are attached to a range of interests from the attraction of foreign capital to the 
provision of social security through a broadening of peoples’ assets. This is particularly 
apparent in the context of purchasing shares in state owned enterprises and suggests a shift 
in the inclusive nature of neo-liberalisation. Under this change, the responsibility of the 
state lies not in compelling participation on the grounds of citizenship and education as it 
did for Helen Clark, but in developing an entire set of market inclusions for those with 
sufficient ability or capital to engage them. This was crystallised in 2012 when a $1000 
minimum buy-in was established for the purchase of shares in soon-to-be privatised state 
owned enterprises.  
 
Similarly, the entry of international credit rating agencies into the political lexicon marks 
something of a shift in the government of public spaces. The role of market rating agencies 
(like Standard and Poor, below) suggests something of a “gatekeeper” (MacKenzie, 2011, 
p. 1778) role for the trade of securities, indicating a “growing trend towards private 
ordering of traditionally public functions” (Schwarcz, 2002, p. 2). Characteristic of the 
Third Way under Helen Clark was a ‘partnership’ ethos where the Government contracted 
public (often health) services out to not-for-profits or other para-state agencies. The 
deployment of rating agencies in the quote below can be read as marking a continuation of 
this trend. Private companies like Standard and Poor can be seen to play an increasingly 
significant role in the regulation of markets, and subsequently develop an influence over 
the functions of the state apparatus:  
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And it is precisely the difficulties those countries are in that has led to Standard and 
Poor’s putting New Zealand on negative outlook. When we are borrowing $300 
million a week, have an overvalued exchange rate, and face the prospect of a credit 
rating downgrade, the Government believes it should be spending less and 
therefore borrowing less. 
 
These articulations only play a small part in the overall construction of the speech, yet they 
represent a significant point in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand for the role of non-
state actors and the regulation of markets. It can also be argued to represent a shift in the 
type of knowledge that lies behind the construction of value in the market place (Beckert, 
2009). As MacKenzie (2011) argues, the development of credit ratings by agencies like 
Standard and Poor make previously uncertain market functions (like the repayment of 
Government debt, for example) a relative stability by reducing them to a grade or 
classification. While not unchanging, this “is stable and predictable enough to permit 
coordination and rational action” (MacKenzie, 2011, p. 1786). John Key’s “ambitious free 
trade agenda” is thus partially reliant on the ‘creditworthyness’ of New Zealand as a whole, 
based on the stability of a credit rating provided by a private company. This rating then 
goes on to guide the way fiscal balance is pursued. The partial reliance on credit ratings 
marks something of a departure from articulations of education (Clark), family (Shipley), 
community (Bolger), and employment (Lange) as measures for the stability of society. This 
development is important because it represents a further entrenchment of market logic as a 
practice for governing through the privatisation of public space, in this case the private 
regulation of public markets. 
 
The order of discourse in this speech thus represents the laws of the market as not only a 
natural occurrence but also as an intellectual logic for governing through the privatisation 
of public space. The ‘anti-ideology ideology’ displaces the ideologies of politics and 
supplants them with the rigid ideology of the market (Phelan, 2012). This is to be noted 
particularly in the case of private rating agencies. Key’s 2011 speech can thus be argued as 
necessary to the wider social order to the extent that it not only justifies, but also plays a 
role in embedding market logics as a framework for the operation of the state apparatus.  
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John Key; Discursive Practice 
 
This speech reflects the National Government’s attention to economic policy - “economy” 
or “economic” appears 33 times. The most significant policy shift is the move to partially 
privatise a number of state owned enterprises, or, in Key’s terms, “pursuing a mixed 
ownership model”.  
 
Many of Key’s discursive features carry their effect through a reliance on representing 
market-based organisation as a natural state of affairs and a logic for governing: 
 
New Zealand has been through a recession and a global financial crisis. We have a 
chance, now the economy is gathering steam again, to build a solid  platform for 
future growth. …Our trade is rapidly shifting towards Asia, which is growing much 
faster than our traditional markets 
 
The discursive resources that are drawn on in this example are so deeply embedded in a 
framework of market led governing that they seem barely worth challenging. “Markets” 
simply shift and grow. However, as noted in the 1987 speech by David Lange, this has not 
always been the case, notable in his articulation of “steady management” of the economy. 
Even Helen Clark’s aim of including citizens in market functions, which suggests a degree 
of state intervention, do not compare to Key’s articulations of the unquestionable 
autonomy of market forces. This is important because the speech fell at a time when the 
limitations of market forces became increasingly clear through the 2008 financial crisis. As 
the anti-ideology noted earlier shows, the response was not to legislate for more market 
control, but less. This further supports the stabilisation of market logics as a rationale for 
governing.  
 
In addition to the influences of international finance, a number of local specificities are 
deployed throughout the speech. These place the Key within the sediment of New 
Zealand’s settler colonial history. The articulation of “kiwi” (mentioned seven times) can be 
understood to set in motion a discourse of nationalism and sameness paralleling market 
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logics. “Kiwis” in this sense represents a shared and unified imaginary community 
(Anderson, 1991). This is drawn at least partly from New Zealand’s historical specificity as 
a colonial outpost and settler society. The sameness asserted by the deployment of “kiwis” 
was crystallised in a speech delivered a year earlier at Waitangi:  
 
I think it would be a betrayal of Kiwis' basic sense of decency to forget the past and 
the legitimate claims of iwi …I believe it is to the benefit of all New Zealanders 
that we move beyond the settlement phase of our history (Key, 2010)  
  
While this could hardly be said to constitute a deliberate disavowal of founding colonial 
violence as discussed in chapter two under Mike Moore, there is an obvious slippage 
between “Maori” and “Kiwis”. This would be reflected again in 2012 through the sale of 
state owned power companies when the stumbling block of iwis’ special interest in water 
would be represented as hindering “kiwis” access to investment. The assertion of “kiwis” 
as a homogenous group in relation to range of market led policies thus provides part of a 
link between the ideology of market led governing and New Zealand as a settler society. 
This link is important because it can be seen as part of Key’s overall strategy to reduce 
many areas of public life to logics of the market, perpetuating the representation of his 
anti-ideological position.  
 
A related (but distinct) discursive feature of Key’s 2011 speech is the “mum and dad 
investor”. In New Zealand politics, this is unique to the lexicon of the fifth National 
Government: 
 
New, quality listings on the stock exchange would give mum and dad investors the 
option of putting their savings into large and proven companies, rather than 
relying, as is so often the case, on property investments.  
 
Key’s treatment of the family (signified by “mum and dad”) as a natural unit of society is 
fairly clear and reflects similar articulations around the family under Jim Bolger, who 
adopted the ‘family unit’ as a model for policy development. However, the “mum and dad 
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investor” suggests some other readings. Firstly, as noted above with the discourse of 
“kiwis”, it reveals a number of assumptions about social life in New Zealand. It can be 
linked to Lange’s “little guy”, Moore’s “battlers”, and even Robert Muldoon’s “ordinary 
bloke” (NZ Onscreen, 2010). These are constituted by an image of stable, self-sufficient 
subjects, living something of a peaceful life based on meritocratic principles and hard work; 
a ‘do it yourself’ lifestyle (Bierre et al., 2010). In more etymological terms, the “mum and 
dad investor” has also circulated in a number of Government documents since the mid-
2000s, particularly in relation to housing policy and discourse (Bierre et al., 2010; Housing 
New Zealand Corporation, 2005).  
 
The “mum and dad investor” is not unique to New Zealand. The ‘ma and pa landlord’, for 
example, circulates in American housing discourse, revealing a number of assumptions 
about the nature of lay market knowledge and relatively high risk involved in property 
investment (Bierre et al., 2010). The “mum and dad investor” also appears in the housing 
industry in Australia, demarcating a particular section of the market which is supposed to 
return stable profits from a one-off investment. In Key’s terms, the “mum and dad 
investor” can be taken to refer to lay investors with relatively small amounts of money tied 
up in investments for retirement, inheritance, or other forms of social security. 
 
Key’s use of the “mum and dad investor” highlights a degree of intertdiscursivity and 
intertextuality. As highlighted above, the term circulates in a number of fields 
internationally and locally, mainly in housing and investment but appears by extension in 
discourses surrounding retirement, inheritance, and other forms of social security. This is 
important because Key’s use of “mum and dad investor” in relation to a new and relatively 
controversial policy supports an understanding of social change, demanding discursive 
support beyond immediately available political rhetoric. In this sense, the “mum and dad 
investor” can be argued to support increased privatisation and an assumption that market 
logics are an appropriate mechanism for social organisation through the creation of savings 
and investment for social security.  
 
By referring to investment as a mechanism for social security, Key attempts to paint the 
“mixed-ownership model” as a mechanism of market inclusion in conjunction with a sell-
down of assets to reduce Government debt. This has the effect of representing 
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privatisation as a pragmatic approach to managing both economic and social affairs. All 
speakers in this project represent the organisation of markets as a matter of pragmatism 
and common sense reaction to some degree. However, Key’s claim to follow no ideology 
at all marks a discursive break with other speakers. This is noted not only in the suggestion 
that he is “not interested in following any particular ideology”, but also in the policy 
backdrop to his two terms (as of early 2013) as Prime Minister. The ‘follow through’ of the 
Key’s  market logics can be seen in the increased privatisations discussed above as well as 
in the reduction of the top personal tax rate (from 39 to 33 per cent) and the introduction 
of the 90 day working bill in 2008. While these policies were resisted in parliament and by 
the public, in each case they were framed by Key as much needed and common sense re-
regulation to improve New Zealand’s fortunes in market performance.  
 
In sum, Key’s discursive practice can be argued to represent a moment of ‘common sense’ 
neo-liberalisation. Key’s deployment of “kiwis” as an imaginary and unitary community can 
be constructed as a way to join New Zealand’s history as a settler society with market 
logics, as part of an intellectual framework for governing. Similarly, the “mum and dad 
investor” suggests an image of self-sufficient family relations and ‘do-it-yourself’ lifestyle. It 
can be argued to represent a type of lay investor, characterised by relatively high risk who is 
in need of state protection to secure savings for social security. Each of these features point 
to a mode of neo-liberalisation that is characterised by the representation of market logic as 
an ideology for governing.  
 
 
John Key; Transitive Order 
 
Key’s focus on market trends and functions leads to a markedly different account of 
grammatical choice and representation in comparison to other speeches in this project. The 
most significant transitive features of Key’s speech surround the representation of market 
forces as a natural entity, something that expands, contracts, grows, and shrinks without 
human intervention. This is important because it lends support to the market ideology by 
creating an air of inevitability surrounding economic affairs.  
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The lack of volitional human action throughout the transitive order of Key’s speech reveals 
one of the ways that alternatives to the present arrangement of market capitalism are 
foreclosed and obscured. For example: “That means making responsible decisions now, as 
the economy picks up, to increase national savings and reduce the country’s debt”. 
 
There are three reactions and one action represented in this sentence. “Making responsible 
decisions”, “increase”, and “reduce” are all human reactions to the action of “picks up”, 
which contains no human agency. While “increase” and “reduce” clearly involve human 
actions, they are represented as reacting to an existing and unexplainable economic force, 
the reasons for “picks up” are omitted. The representation of agency as solely reactive 
arguably compounds the effect of inevitability created by the omission of agency in the 
economy through its apparent ability to compel reactions.  
 
If the economy was represented as containing specific actions giving context to “picks up”, 
then intervention into its affairs would become more tangible, and thus a matter for policy 
development. For example, if we re-cast the statement as the following, then the 
parameters for intervention are much more obvious: 
 
That means making responsible decisions now, as the economy picks up through 
increases in export activity, national savings and wages, then we can reduce the 
country’s debt 
 
As it stands, the action of “making responsible decisions” carries little weight in 
comparison to the consequences of economic recession. The action bears no imprint on 
the overall trajectory of economic processes when compared to the types of action that are 
suggested to increase economic performance (savings, production and commercialisation 
of new technology and export led agriculture, for example). The nominalisation of “picks 
up” thus constructs the economy as a force impermeable to agency, despite its apparently 
behavioural and human base, a contradiction recognised by theorists of neo-liberalism like 
David Harvey (2005) and John Clarke (2008).  
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Similarly, with “treasury is predicting growth” (below), there are no participants in the 
action of growing other than the “treasury”, who simply observe or predict growth as a 
quasi-natural occurrence. This is carried out in the same way one might predict the weather 
or the rate at which crops grow, revealed by the relatively imprecise nature of the 
measurement itself. This further positions the economy as a matter beyond political agency; 
“treasury is predicting growth in excess of 3 per cent this year, together with higher wages 
and falling unemployment”. 
 
At the same time market forces are represented as having a concrete, examinable, and 
relatively specific impact on the day to day lives of people, in a similar manner to the losses 
faced by victims of natural disaster: “we face the risk of a protracted recession, with a 
significant loss of jobs and a fall in the value of everyone’s homes, businesses and farms”. 
 
In each of these examples, economic processes are represented as natural and inevitable. 
This is achieved through a strategy which elides human agency or represents it as a matter 
of reaction over action, a pattern consistent through the rest of the speech. While these 
representational choices are only analysed briefly here, the way the economy is constructed 
by Key reveals a number of assumptions about the role of government and financial 
markets. In this way, the Government can only take action which adjusts or tinkers with 
market actions - their wider forces cannot be challenged. If Key’s representations are taken 
as accurate, then the policy responses which he suggests (privatisation, tax cuts and “an 
ambitious free trade agenda”) become the obvious choices to overcome the problems 
generated by the 2008 economic crisis, eliding a number of alternative structural changes.  
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5.2  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The general pattern of John Key’s 2011 ‘State of the Nation’ speech reflects, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, his asserted apolitical position and two decades of sometimes contradictory 
neo-liberalisation. The treatment of market forces as a natural and inevitable phenomenon, 
the encouragement of public participation in the share market, the homogenisation of the 
New Zealand population, a professed apolitical position, and the private regulation of 
public markets each point to the way market forces are represented as a logic for 
governing.  
 
The first section outlined some of Key’s broad ideological positions in relation to other 
speakers from this project, noting that his overt assertion that he does not follow “any 
particular ideology” represents a partial discursive break, replacing the ideology of politics 
with an ideology of the market, suggesting a stabilisation of markets as logic for governing. 
The deployment of international rating agency Standard and Poor was given as an example 
to support this, noting the way that a private institution has the ability to regulate the public 
space of the market (Schwarcz, 2002). The discursive analysis focused on the function of 
the “kiwi” as a cultural segue between New Zealand’s history as a settler colonial outpost 
and a distinct type of inclusion into market-based activity. I then examined the “mum and 
dad investor”, suggesting both a cultural positioning of everyday life arrangements, as well 
as its function in furthering a privatisation agenda by relating share market investment to 
social security. Finally, a number of Key’s representations of market forces focused on the 
way markets are positioned as inevitable, encouraging reactions from people in specific 
ways, foreclosing the possibilities of active market control in favour of marked led 
approaches.  
 
Key’s speech is the only one of this project to mention “ideology” explicitly. Other 
speakers reveal a number of assumptions which hedge against a left-right spectrum, but 
Key is the only speaker to reject this dualism. Jenny Shipley merely admits that these 
divides are “much less relevant”, and Helen Clark, while attempting to go beyond 
ideological dogma, was still squarely authored by the social democratic history of the 
Labour party. Key’s overwhelming focus on the market and disavowal of ideology suggests 
that he replaces the ideology of politics with an ideology of the market as a set of 
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normative rules for governing. This is noted particularly in his positioning of the “mum 
and dad investor” as vulnerable, requiring stable market investments to guarantee social 
security. This is also obvious in Key’s adoption of credit ratings from Standard and Poor as 
a guide for regulating public markets.  
 
Key’s attempts at following a market ideology were not always successful. This is apparent 
in the subsequent protests against privatisation which commonly referenced Ruth 
Richardson’s 1991 ‘mother of all budgets’. Ironically, the very anti-ideological projections 
that Key makes provide some of the most fertile ground for challenges to his market led 
social order. Keil (2002, p. 579) notes that as a political strategy the dissemination of 
market logics into everyday life and government “creates new conditions for the 
accumulation of capital; yet it also creates more fissures in which urban resistance and 
social change can take root”. This is particularly apparent in the privatisation of public 
space through rating agencies, where even the most embedded of market functions become 
subject to turning a profit at the expense of populations. This was exemplified in the 
reactions to the 2008 financial crisis in the United States and more recently the Greek debt 
crisis, where the role of rating agencies has been called into question (Financial Crisis  
Enquiry Commission, 2011).  
 
Thus, neo-liberalisation under John Key is contingent on historical and cultural events 
which determine the way markets are contextualised, resisted, and deployed as governing 
logics in their own right. The ‘anti-ideology, ideology’ (Phelan, 2012) is particularly 
suggestive of this trend, crystallising a relatively stable but rigid market ideology. This is 
most obviously apparent in the responses to the 2008 financial crisis, which appeared to 
favour not less market logic, but more, reflected in privatisation in the name of debt 
reduction and social security, as well as the privatisation of public space. This is supported 
by the rise of the discursive and transitive forms like the “the mum and dad investor”, the 
inevitability of economic shifts and related placement of powerless subjects in relation to 
market forces. These are not unique to Key’s speeches; similar features make appearances 
in Clark’s, Shipley’s, and Bolger’s articulations. But for Key, the ways in which these are 
represented as a rubric for governing is paramount; it arguably reflects the degree to which 
market logics have become embedded in political and cultural consciousness.  
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This is particularly significant because Clark’s  professed end to neo-liberalism in 2002 is 
arguably misinformed, marking not an end, but a new direction for the entrenchment of 
markets in everyday life. The cultural rubrics with which social life is sustained are now 
informed by entrepreneurialism, self-responsibility, and public involvement in markets of 
diverse kinds. Key’s articulations of an apolitical moment in the neo-liberalisation of New 
Zealand can be argued to obscure the “politically contingent nature of the global market 
project” (Neilson, 2011, p. 70). This is notable particularly where the functions of the 
global rating agencies are inserted into Key’s discursive practice, truncating the possibilities 
for alternative action surrounding a recession. Following Gramsci, one could understand 
Key’s anti-ideological approach as a partial combination of “development and a world-
view”, the successful occupation of a historically contingent moment and simultaneously “a 
syncretic historical residue, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations 
and potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects” 
(Rupert, 2003, p. 185). This suggests that while Key’s approach to governing is dominated 
by an ideology of the market, it could take diverse, unpredictable, and perhaps 
contradictory turns, reacting to the products of the pragmatic field he works within.  
 
While I argue that Key’s historically contingent moment in neo-liberalisation to be best 
understood through a market ideology, it cannot ignore the role of the wider ideological 
state apparatus. The role of mass communication and media, for example, plays an 
increasingly important part in disseminating market logics, particularly in the disavowal of 
ideology, as Phelan (Phelan, 2012) has shown. Similarly, such ideological domination would 
need to take into account the: 
 
conservative legitimating role played by cultural, educational, religious, and media 
institutions…the intellectual and moral leadership of contending classes, the role 
played in this regard by the organic intellectuals of dominant and subordinate social 
classes (Roper, 2011, p. 15) 
 
While I have only examined one text in relative isolation, the conclusions drawn from the 
analyses above suggest that Key represents a moment of neo-liberalisation characterised by 
a use of market ideology as a guide for governing. It is thus with a degree of tentativeness 
that Key’s moment in neo-liberalisation could be labelled the ‘market ideology’. 
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6.  Concluding Comments: Neo-liberalism and its Fortunes  
 
This project set out to challenge the assumption that neo-liberalism represents a coherent 
and monolithic social and political theory and practice. Deploying the methodology of 
critical discourse analysis, I highlighted a number of instabilities and contradictions that 
have characterised neo-liberalism in New Zealand since the 1980s.  This was delivered 
through a critical examination of seven speeches, each delivered in an election year by New 
Zealand Prime Ministers. I began with David Lange who was elected in 1984, and ended 
with John Key, who retains a relatively stable hold on power in early 2013.  
 
This final chapter summarises the main outcomes of the project. I begin by highlighting the 
research problem and why neo-liberalism in New Zealand should be analysed in shifting 
and unstable ways. Key elements of the theoretical assumptions and research design are 
then recapped. Each of the substantive chapters is summarised, noting their key points and 
significance within broad governing logics. A comment then proffers some limitations and 
departures for further investigation. I finally make some tentative projections of neo-
liberalism’s fortunes in a ‘post-crisis’ world.  
 
 
6.1  The Neo-liberal Turn and Term 
 
In its most axiomatic form neo-liberalism is: 
 
A theory of  political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. (Harvey, 2005, p. 2) 
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This framework has been realised through the anti-inflationary and monetarist theories of  
Milton Friedman (1962) and Freidrich Hayek (1960) (among others) around a “preference 
for market over state, individual over collective interests, and economic freedom over 
political freedom” (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1960 in; Phelan, 2007, p. 10). 
 
Throughout this project, I have used ‘neo-liberalisation’ rather than ‘neo-liberalism’, which 
I argue best captures its emergent socio-political logics across different spaces and times. I 
wish to distance this project from a monolithic conception of neo-liberalism which is often 
positioned as “backward, greedy, anarchic and impoverishing” (Alexander, 1995, p. 78). I 
focused instead on internal and contextual features which are often unstable and 
contradictory. I argue that this instability and contradiction often reflects New Zealand’s 
history as a settler colony, the Treaty of Waitangi, ethnicity, gender, and political 
relationships with Asia and the United Kingdom, among other conjectures. To show this I 
drew predominantly on Fairclough’s (1998) ‘order of discourse’ framework of critical 
discourse analysis, which focuses on the micro, meso and macro components of discourse. 
This is supported by Gramsci’s (1992) hegemony and common sense, Althusser’s (1971) 
ideological state apparatus, and Foucault’s governmentality (1991) and power (2008). This 
framework enables an understanding of neo-liberalisation’s unstable and contradictory 
features. 
 
The analyses focused on seven speeches delivered by each Prime Minister of the last 30 
years. The analyses began at the macro level, charting some of the speeches’ most basic 
contextual features, noting broad political conditions, events, and influences. I then 
focused on the discursive practice of the speaker, on key phrases or concepts from each 
centred on their possible origins, functions, and meanings. Finally, a close analysis of key 
paragraphs noted the way grammatical choices frame representations of reality, revealing 
key assumptions about the nature of agency and market forces. 
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6.2  Summary of Analyses  
 
This section notes some key points exposed in the analysis of the seven Prime Ministerial 
speeches. While not exhaustive, they indicate the contradictory and unstable nature of neo-
liberalisation in New Zealand.  
 
The fourth Labour Government was elected in 1984 after a landslide victory in a snap 
election. While some structural adjustments had been made earlier, a political stoush in 
Robert Muldoon’s leadership, a currency and employment crisis combined with discontents 
over the Treaty of Waitangi enabled an already willing group of politicians to pursue a 
market led agenda. 
 
David Lange’s 1987 speech charts some of his Government’s policies for the following 
term. The analysis revealed the instability of market led logic, noted in a slippage between 
the description of a state of affairs and a resulting policy prescription, representing the 
market led agenda as inevitable. Lange’s assertion that his market led policies had no 
alternative is contradicted by an articulation of economic “management”, while 
simultaneously pursuing sweeping deregulation. I took this instability to indicate the 
emergence of a hegemonic regime, where conditions for alternative policy arrangements 
exist within Lange’s articulations. This also supports Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) 
argument that a new spirit of capitalism of the 1980s had begun to include previously 
contradictory principles of fairness, inclusion, and stimulation in capitalist networks of 
management. 
 
Geoffrey Palmer’s 1990 speech revealed a number of contradictory features related to the 
institutionalisation of the Treaty of Waitangi and technocratic discourse. Palmer’s 
technocratic approach to rule can be argued to construct what Greisman and Ritzer (1981, 
p. 35) call a “completely functional and antiseptic space”, where rules and government 
structures are beyond democratic influence. This is important because Palmer’s position as 
a lawyer, Member of Parliament and Prime Minister gives privileged access to the 
discursive resources of governing, enabling a representation of regulatory positions as free 
of ideology. Indeed, he suggested that ideology “is frequently irrelevant” (Palmer, 1992 in; 
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Hayward, 2004, p. 181). It was also noted that technocratic discourse has roots in 
positivism (McKenna & Graham, 2000), lending Palmer’s articulations a ‘factual’ self-
evident quality where tensions might otherwise be apparent.  
 
A significant contradiction of Palmer’s speech was noted in his suggestion of 
institutionalising the Treaty of Waitangi. This simultaneously supported the formation of 
pro-market organisations representing established iwi and contradicted a wider agenda of 
reducing the size of the state (Kelsey, 1991). While rangatiratanga (self-determination) 
could be worked into the individualisation of market led reform, the liberalisation of state 
structures and an increasingly rigorous focus on resolving historic Treaty claims proved 
irreconcilable (Kelsey, 1991).  
 
Mike Moore delivered his speech in 1990 after he became Prime Minister. He articulated a 
wide range of discourses: Labour’s history of “fairness, equality and respect” is juxtaposed 
with the “battler” as an idealized, self-sufficient, and entrepreneurial citizen, as well as the 
representation of economic gain requiring pain. This was argued to be exemplary of the 
contradictory and often unstable nature of neo-liberalisation. This is particularly notable in 
the “battler” which was argued to have multiple meanings, reflecting New Zealand’s 
position as a colonial settler society.  
 
In sum, the fourth Labour Government represents the unstable, contradictory, and 
emergent parameters of neo-liberalisation. With the institutionalisation of Treaty of 
Waitangi and rise of entrepreneurial subjects, the fourth Labour Government suggests a 
diverse range of ideological interests and actions. A number of these nuances would be 
noted years later, particularly through Helen Clark where the institutionalisation of the 
Treaty under “closing the gaps”, entrepreneurialism, and equality would be subsumed into 
an inclusive moment in neo-liberalisation.  
 
The fourth National Government came into power off the back Labour’s leadership fallout 
between Lange and Minister of Finance Roger Douglas. Jim Bolger held the seat of Prime 
Minister for seven years before being deposed by New Zealand’s first female leader, Jenny 
Shipley. Despite a heavy repudiation of Labour’s market led policies, Ruth Richardson, the 
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new Minister of Finance, broadly continued a monetarist agenda, not only de-regulating 
employment conditions but also rolling-back the welfare state.  
 
Despite the apparently destructive mode of neo-liberalisation that Bolger engaged with, his 
own articulation of a “decent society” suggested a reaction against the extremity of market 
led reform. The “decent society” can be understood to reflect Bolger’s communitarianism, 
a framework characterised by a “sense that individuals are shaped by the communities to 
which they belong and thus owe them a debt of respect and consideration” (Heywood, 
1998, p. 148). This drew a strong contrast to the professed social democratic roots of the 
Labour Government and to Shipley’s later attempt to formalise the relationship between 
the state and its citizens. The “decent society” combined with an entrepreneurial 
positioning of “opportunity” projected a utopian image of self-sufficient and cohesive 
communities. This tendentially supported Richardson’s cutting of welfare support through 
a push for people to rely on family and community networks rather than the state. 
 
Shipley’s time as Prime Minister emerged from the introduction of MMP and the balance 
of power held by Winston Peters after the 1996 election. Her 1997 speech revealed an 
emerging attempt to formalise the relationship between the state and its citizens. This gave 
way to the organisation of the welfare state around social capital and the reponsibilisation 
of families. This would later be crystallised in the Code of Social and Family Responsibility, 
which specifically articulated a number ‘best practice’ approaches to child care, 
employment, household budget management, and other domestic affairs. I argued that this 
marks an important moment in the neo-liberalisation of New Zealand through the ‘liberal 
dilemma’, a tension between libertarian (freedom from the state) and conservative 
(protection of family life) values. Some issues generated by the monetarist agenda, such as 
unemployment and increased inequality, were examined but not solved. The outcomes of 
reform were bought to the fore and recast in terms of individual responsibility. A lack of 
focus on the role of the state would eventually undermine the Government.  
 
The National Government moved market led reform into areas untouched by Labour, 
restructuring healthcare, employment conditions, and social welfare. I argued that these 
developments, apart from accentuating some contradictions inherent in Bolger’s 
communitarianism, reflected a broad shift from the ‘destructive’ moment of neo-
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liberalisation towards what Brenner and Theodore (2008) call ‘actually existing neo-
liberalism’, characterised by a simultaneous roll-back of the welfare state and the somewhat 
tendential creation of new political logics for governing, like the Code of Social and Family 
Responsibility.  
 
The fifth Labour Government marks a local example of the Third Way, characterised by an 
emphasis on the values of social democracy combined with the central tenets of free trade 
and market logics, in an attempt to go beyond the problems of both. Clark’s 1999 speech 
reflects this position, noted particularly in her focus on “closing the gaps” in an attempt to 
reduce the inequalities through education and inclusion in employment markets. While 
aims at reducing inequality were laudable, the “gap” was overwhelming cast as a problem 
of Maori under-accumulation vis-à-vis others. Though the term “closing the gaps” was 
dropped, the aim of including Maori in economic processes was continued, reflecting a 
strategy of “capacity building” that would ostensibly enable indigenous people to “govern 
themselves and determine their own path of development” (Humpage & Fleras, 2001, p. 
49). Similarly, Clark’s articulation of “human capital” highlighted her emphasis on inclusive 
market led governing by positioning people as a commodity on which to draw for 
economic growth.  
 
The very nature of Third Way discourse is contradictory, assembling previously 
irreconcilable ideological forms. Yet these are deployed with relative coherence, serving 
temporally limited or ‘vehicular’ purposes before being abandoned or reformulated to ‘fix’ 
a new contradiction (McLennan, 2004). I argued that Clark’s position in neo-liberalisation 
could be understood as ‘inclusive-vehicular neo-liberalisation’.  
 
The fifth National Government won the 2008 election under the narrative of “building a 
brighter future”, a utopian signification of managing a financial crisis and reducing 
Government debt in order to stimulate market performance. The analysis of Key’s 2011 
speech outlined a deep entrenchment of market logics and a disavowal of politics, resulting 
in a naturalised ‘market ideology’. Key’s articulation of privatisation as beneficial to “mum 
and dad investors” and the private ordering of public space through the rating agency 
Standard and Poor was argued to position market logic as a rubric for governing. I 
suggested that Key’s articulations mark something of a cultural as well as ideological break, 
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where the ‘everydayness’ of market logic has become stabilised enough to guide 
Government action.  
 
 
6.3  Neo-liberalism’s Fortunes 
 
The analyses which I have offered in this project show that neo-liberalism constitutes more 
than a political doctrine or strategy of government. The premise which I departed from, 
that neo-liberalisation in New Zealand is often contradictory and unstable, holds true. 
However, in many ways, this reveals more questions than it answers. It is not obvious, for 
example, what it is about neo-liberalisation at different conjunctures that enables or 
disables stability. Yet it is possible to “highlight constitutive dimensions that are ultimately 
grounded in contestable assumptions and which, in the mundane flow of social life, are 
often rendered invisible as contingent foundations” (Phelan, 2012, p. 25).  
 
Similarly, this project has loosely assigned each Prime Minister a position within the neo-
liberalisation of New Zealand, yet the production of speech is only one part of Governing 
and ideological domination. I have left the dissemination, consumption, and reproduction 
of discourse open for investigation and challenge. This project has not addressed many of 
the wider conditions on which neo-liberalisation is sustained. It has not been possible to 
say exactly what effect events or breaks have on both speakers and people as political 
agents.  
 
There are also a number of limitations in the extrapolation of meaning and signification 
from the apparently coherent discursive forms in the seven speeches. While I seek to undo 
a monolithic conception of neo-liberalism and attend to some of its nuances, I have only 
presented some possible readings of speakers’ discursive work. There are of course 
multiple, possibly contradictory readings to each of the features I have highlighted. 
Similarly, I departed from but one possible simplistic moment: the election of a 
Government. To be sure, there are other possibly more poignant events and crises to 
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depart from, such as the oil shock of 1979 or the establishment of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ in 1989. 
 
Despite these limitations, this project can provide a tentative projection for neo-
liberalisation’s immediate fortunes. It seems likely that despite the challenges of the 2008 
financial crisis, neo-liberalisation will in some ways at least, continue for the foreseeable 
future. I would tentatively suggest that the cultural rubrics for social reproduction, 
dominated as they now are by entrepreneurial freedoms, will provide a blue print for the 
regulation of day to day social life in the next few years. As Jim Bolger’s communitarian 
position has shown, the flanking of neo-liberalisation by supplementary ideological 
frameworks has contributed to the increasingly complex and messy nature of governing 
through principles of market freedom. As ever, the conditions of possibility for resistance 
within these combinations are evident in their genesis. The proposed market freedoms 
which have characterised much of neo-liberalisation’s most recent development, dominated 
by a simple market ideology, are narrow and rigid indeed. The prospect for much wider, 
socially constructive and empowering freedoms rests in the truly popular control of the 
state apparatus. 
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